Who Acts? Community through Chance by Kunz, Jonas LH
Bard College 
Bard Digital Commons 
Senior Projects Fall 2017 Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects 
Fall 2017 
Who Acts? Community through Chance 
Jonas LH Kunz 
Bard College, jk9956@bard.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_f2017 
 Part of the Political Theory Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Kunz, Jonas LH, "Who Acts? Community through Chance" (2017). Senior Projects Fall 2017. 29. 
https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_f2017/29 
This Open Access work is protected by copyright and/or 
related rights. It has been provided to you by Bard 
College's Stevenson Library with permission from the 
rights-holder(s). You are free to use this work in any way 
that is permitted by the copyright and related rights. For 
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-
holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by 
a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the 
work itself. For more information, please contact 
digitalcommons@bard.edu. 
WHO ACTS? 
Community through Chance 
Senior Project submitted to  
The Division of  Social Studies  
Of  Bard College  
By 
Jonas Kunz 
Annandale-on-Hudson, New York 
Dezember 2017  

For Pamela Scholz and her Trust  

I would like to thank Roger Berkowitz Claire Harvey Luke Harrington  
Puce Artemis Kotioni Adam Brown Helga Karamete Karin Reimpell 
The Stevenson Library  
Kline Commons 
My Mother  
My Father  

Abstract 
In this paper I will argue that sortition - choosing representatives by chance - could be a way of  
conciliating the disenchanted democratic citizens with their government. Current democracies suffer 
under what has been termed the democratic fatigue syndrome. Low voter turnouts, decreasing citizen 
participation, high rates of  distrust and a subsequent rise of  nationalist movements. But underlying this 
fatigue seems to be a general systematic problem, which Robert J. Pranger, Hannah Arendt and Max 
Weber identify as the politics of  interests. These politics rely on competition, coalitions and assertive 
creativity, - en grow - they rely on power and power play.  
 These politics of  interests are closely related with the method of  choosing representatives via 
elections. Elections congeal diversity of  political interests and opinion into one campaign theme. 
Throughout the development of  the republican tradition elections became a more popular mode of  
finding representatives, largely due to the rational hierarchy inherent in elections. This natural 
hierarchy also assumes a natural distinction between politician and voter and has in the long run caused 
the current problem of  interest based politics and a disenchanted citizenry. 
In the American context, the founding fathers did not envision a purely interest based polity. 
Rater the polity should be full of  liberty, balancing private ambition with toleration and thereby 
creating community. Because, however, the federal government has increasingly become subject to 
elected officials, interests have obscured the public good of  toleration. Today, the factious tendencies of  
the federal government seem stronger than ever, creating vicious groups of  membership with us against 
them mindsets. The original idea of  union in the American community has fallen silent. 
Sortition, qua its characters of  freedom and equality and its necessary plurality could work to 
recreate such community. I will attempt to relate sortition to Robert J. Pranger’s ideas of  liberty and 
Hannah Arendt’s conception of  the founding moment of  the US Constitution.  

Preface 
With the publication of  his book, Against Elections - The Case for Democracy, David Van Reybrouck, 
speaks to a certain aspect of  traditional republican thinking that had been lost over the years, namely, 
the fact that elections are not the only method to delegate representatives. There is, in fact, another 
method to select state officials, which was celebrated in early republics. This method was appointment 
by lot. The process of  which, we will call “sortition.”  1
In Ancient Athens, Ancient Rome, and in a number of  medieval and Renaissance city states, 
some, or a significant amount, of  the political administration was delegated to representatives chosen by 
lot. What might seem today like a strange way of  choosing representatives appears to have been 
perfectly normal—at least in Ancient Athens during the Age of  Demosthenes. Through sortition the 
average citizen was usually more involved in a deliberative fashion, since lot discriminatory than the 
method of  election. 
Exploring the use of  lot in the political context has been a very surprising journey to me. 
Initially, I was under the impression that only a small circle of  academics had given any thought to the 
use of  lot in Ancient Greece. I have since learned that political scientists, like Bernard Manin, have 
minutely drawn out its history up to the present day;  that popular authors, like Reybrouck, have sold 2
books on the topic outside academic circles; that academics and activists, like James Fiskin, have 
implemented deliberative, randomly chosen, citizen bodies;  that institutions, like the European Union, 3
 David Van Reybrouck and Liz Waters, Against Elections: The Case for Democracy (London: Bodley Head, 2016), 15.1
 Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997).2
 James S. Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (Oxford [u.a.]: Oxford Univ. 3
Press, 2011).
 I
have made use of  sortition in policy questions;  and that countries like Canada have brought citizens 4
and politicians together, who were randomly chosen, to work on a constitutional amendment.   5
What I thought to be a niche intuition that I had gotten from my good friend, Luke Harrington, 
has turned out to be a serious political question today. Strange, neither he nor I had encountered it 
earlier in our respective studies of  history and political science. Or maybe not strange, but rather 
indicative of  the unorthodox approach of  sortition: to choose representatives by lot, to choose 
representatives randomly, right out of  the population. 
Indeed, to choose representatives randomly seems counterintuitive to the political processes we 
are accustomed to. We see a politician, as “a person who is professionally involved in politics, especially 
as a holder of  an elected office.”  We may very well not want a body of  randomly chosen citizen to 6
make decisions on our behalf; we believe that would be unjustified. We cannot consent to the rule of  
someone who has been chosen at random in the same way as we consent to the power of  politicians we 
elect. Furthermore, may we think that politicians in fact need to be professionals that deal with highly 
complicated policy questions on a daily basis. They are educated and talented in a way that the 
ordinary citizen is not, which is precisely the reason why they are distinguished and precisely the reason 
we vote for them. 
This distinction Bernard Manin terms the principle of  distinction.  A principle inherent in the 7
elective method that makes us choose a representative that is distinguished from us. The distinction 
between us and the person we chose to give our vote to depends very much on our act of  choice. 
Whom do we deem worthy of  our vote. We are free to choose whichever candidate we deem best, and 
 last modified September 18, 2012, accessed December 9, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/4
201210/20121011ATT53444/20121011ATT53444EN.pdf.
  accessed December 8, 2017, http://www.ppforum.ca/publications/deliberative-polling®-canada.5
 accessed December 8, 2017, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/politician.6
 Manin, The Principles.7
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that is the politically our freedom. Sortition, however, does not allow us any such freedom of  choice. We 
don’t get to vote and we don’t get to choose. Instead, sortition is based entirely on chance. 
Why then, did the people of  Ancient Athens use sortition? Or why has the idea of  using 
sortition found recent revival? And of  course also: why has the concept of  sortition lost to the concept 
of  elections over time?   
The reason why the Ancients used sortition and the reason why it has resurfaced recently, is 
because it offers a different approach to representative democracy, than elections. In terms of  specific 
policy questions, sortition has, somehow, allowed for a closer relationship between the policy question 
and the citizenry. 
One interesting example in which a randomly selected body of  citizens was convened was the 
Irish constitutional debate around gay rights. The Irish Constitutional Convention (ICC), born out of  
the economic crisis of  2008-09, comprised 100 members of  which two-thirds were randomly  chosen 8
citizens. The other third were politicians.  Together, they deliberated on the question whether gay rights 9
should be amended into the constitution of  Ireland. To answer this question the deliberative body was 
supplied with information. First, by hearing different “expert” opinions; second, by discussing those. As 
the Washington Post wrote: “Constitutional lawyers and child psychologists, who had provided briefing 
documents in advance, made brief  presentations…“ But not only „elites“ supplied information but also 
advocates were given a chance to present their opinion, “including a Catholic bishop, adult children of  
same-sex couples and a gay opponent of  marriage equality.”  The ICC also considered a significant 10
amount of  questions presented via social media. “After a weekend of  deliberation and debate, the 
members voted on the matter in secret, as was the ICC practice. A full 79 percent voted in favor of  
 Demographically fair representation was applied.8
 See The Irish vote for marriage equality started at a constitutional convention, David Farrell, Clodagh Harris and Jane 9
Suiter, The Washington Post, June 5, 2015. (It should be noted that all three authors of this article were members of the 
academic and legal team that supported the work of the ICC, as indicated on the bottom of the article.)
 Ibid.10
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recommending that marriage equality be put on the ballot.”  In late May 2015, Ireland introduced 11
marriage equality into its constitution. Many interest groups claimed credit for that success, however, as 
the Washington Post wrote: “deliberation produced a real-world constitutional change, the first time 
that that has happened – showing this method really can matter.”  12
What characterizes a deliberative body is that its members are chosen out of  a specific 
population, for a specific task, for a specific time. The body is usually comprised of  200 too 400 people 
that are a “representative sample” of  the population.  The people chosen are asked to deliberate on a 13
certain topic. Participants will receive balanced information in the form of  written material and “expert 
presentations,” as it was done Ireland. Ireland also shows that if  the topic is of  concern to the broader 
population, then some part of  the deliberative process is often televised. Televising gives the population 
the opportunity to participate in the process by questioning and observing.  
James S. Fishkin from the University of  Stanford is a the proponent and maybe the founder of  
the idea he trademarked, “deliberative polling.” He started the method of  deliberative polling in the 
presidential elections of  1988, suggesting in an article in the Atlantic that a random body of  citizens 
would better reflect what the general population thought about the different Democratic and 
Republican electoral candidates than conventional poling data. Instead of  just obtaining individual 
opinions on each candidate with traditional polls, the new process enabled Fishkin to observe how public 
opinion manifests. As quoted by Reybrouck, Fishkin wrote: “These [traditional] polls model what the 
public is thinking when it is not thinking… A deliberative poll models what the public would think if  it 
had a better chance to think about issues.”  Fishkin proposed convening a random body of  citizens to 14
 Ibid.11
 Ibid.12
 Proponents of the idea, as well as specific events vary to the freedom of randomness often trying to account fairly for 13
race, gender, geography and socio-economic variables in the representative samples. There are however also samples that 
are based on voluntary participation like in Ancient Athens. 
 Reybrouck and Waters, Against Elections, 108.14
 IV
deliberate on each and every potential nominee. Such deliberation would subsequently be broadcast 
and the opinions be recorded.  
Fishkin did not manage to create a deliberative poll in 1988, he did, however, in 1996, in Austin 
Texas, which was broadcast by PBS.  The results were “striking” as Reybrouck writes: “The 15
consultation process had made the citizens significantly more competent and more sophisticated in their 
political judgments as they had learned to adjust their opinion and had become more aware of  the 
complexity of  political decision-making.”  Until today deliberative polls have been used in more than 16
24 countries, often dealing with controversial issues that have stalled in the ordinary political 
processes.   17
In 2012, Lawrence Lessing and Roy L. Furman proposed that the Senate Judiciary Committee 
use a deliberative body on the topic of  “Taking Back Our Democracy: Responding To Citizen United 
And The Rise of  Super PACs.” The deliberative body would “produce a mature and stable view about 
the issues presented,” and “face the extraordinary lack of  confidence that Americans have in their 
government.”   18
In 2010, a deliberative poll was held in Michigan with 300 randomly chosen citizens, 
representative of  Michigan’s demography, who deliberated on questions of  unemployment, education 
and taxation.  After deliberation, 45% voted for an increase in income tax, up from 27% percent prior 19
to deliberation.  The preference to decrease business tax went from 40% to 67%, and the “making 20
 Ibid.15
 Ibid., 111.16
 Ibid.17
 A Proposal to Convene a series of „Citizen Conventions“ for proposing amendments to the constitution, July 24, 2012, pp. 18
198-201. 
 Stanford, CDD. "Final Report: By the People - Hard Times, Hard Choices - Michigan Residents Deliberate." CDD. 19
Center for Deliberative Democracy Stanford, 01 Jan. 2010. Web. 28 Apr. 2017.
 Ibid, p. 620
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Michigan a greener economy” proposal from 55% to 67% approval rating.  The factual based 21
knowledge index overall increased 7.7%.  This last increase by 7.7% is interesting. It shows that that 22
actual knowledge barely increased, while all other data significantly shifted.  This may suggest that it is 23
not so much the increase in information that causes people to change their mind, but rather the chance 
to deliberate itself.  
Deliberative polls seem to have an educative effect on those participating. These polls allow for 
the creation of  a space to think. At a time when the people have very little trust in their politicians, 
Deliberative Polls may prove effective in reinstating confidence in the political process and effective in 
bring people and politicians together. 
This lack of  confidence that, not only, Americans, but also many citizens of  other western 
governments experience, is the reason Reybrouck cites for the resurfacing of  lot, and the idea of  
deliberative democracy. What Laskin et al. called a lack of  confidence; Reybrouck calls “the 
Democratic Fatigue syndrome.”  The idea, or rather the observation, is that the people find themselves 24
increasingly alienated from their politicians. This is shown in decreasing voter turnouts, decreasing 
citizen participation, high rates of  distrust, and a subsequent rise of  nationalist movements.  Or as 25
Reybrouck wrote:  
…anyone who puts together low voter turnout, high voter turnover, declining party 
membership, governmental impotence, political paralysis, electoral fear of  failure, lack of  
recruitment, compulsive self-promotion, chronic electoral fever, exhausting media stress, 
distrust, indifference and other persistent paroxysms sees the outlines of  a syndrome 
 Ibid, p. 1021
 Ibid, p. 1322
 As much as questions in a General Knowledge Index can do so. 23
 Reybrouck and Waters, Against Elections, 1624
 The New York Times. "Europe’s Rising Far Right: A Guide To The Most Prominent Parties". Nytimes.com. N.p., 2017. 25
Web. 28 Apr. 2017.
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emerging. Democratic Fatigue Syndrome is a disorder that has not yet been fully described 
but from which countless Western societies are nonetheless unmistakably suffering.  26
Based on the factors that Reybrouck lists, and as the meaning of  fatigue suggests, the people have 
started to “opt out” of  the political process. This lack of  participation has led to distrust and a lack of  
confidence. Or, as Josine Blok wrote: “A major cause for the observed decline in commitment and trust, 
as many political analysts agree, is a lack of  citizens’ active participation.”  She goes on to say: 27
“According to one school of  thought, however, this absence is not a failure of  the system or a historical 
coincidence, but the corollary of  the principle of  representation underlying modern democracies (that 
is since the late eighteenth century).”  She explains that “in such a political system, citizens transfer 28
their individual share in sovereignty to their representatives by the act of  voting, and the resulting 
distance between representatives (who act) and represented (who vote) is an intentional, necessary 
feature of  the system.”  The voting system has the effect of  outsourcing the ability to act from the 29
voter to the representative. The voter, then alienated from the ability to act politically, will feel alienated 
from the political process itself. The principle of  distinction, therefore, not only has the effect of  
distinguishing between those that vote and those that are voted for, but also distinguishes between those 
that act and those that do not act. Today, on might say that this distinction disenchants the general 
citizen with the political process. In an inverted sense, we might be compelled to say that over time 
elections have shown their most deeply rooted characteristic: the principle of  distinction  between 30
elected and electors.  
 Reybrouck and Waters, Against Elections, 16.26
 Josine Blok, "Participatory Governance - the Case for Allotment," etnofoor 26, no. 2 (2014): 74.27
 Ibid.28
 Ibid.29
 I take this wording from Bernard Manin who uses this characteristic – the principle of distinction – to explain the 30
underlying principle of the method of elections and how it came about historically. “Another inegalitarian characteristic of 
representative government, however, was deliberately introduced after extensive discussion, namely that the representatives 
be socially superior to those who elect them.” Manin, The Principles, 94.
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A proposed remedy to this alienation may be the method of  lot, which does not make use of  the 
principle of  distinction. Today, a striking number of  countries have a platform for deliberative 
democracy. Many of  them have used it for a directly related government function, such as finding 
consensus regarding an amendment to the constitution.  But the movement has gone even further, 31
from simply advocating certain policies, to the suggestion by Terril G. Bouricious to replace the current 
legislative branch of  the US government with six different bodies, all chosen by lot.  32
In the subsequent chapter, I compare the method of  lot and the method of  election. The case 
par excellence for the method of  lot is classical Athens. After exploring how lot worked in Ancient Athens 
I follow its historical discussion in writings by Aristotle, Montesquieu, Rousseau, the Federalists, and the 
Anti-Federalists. These writings illustrate that the method of  lot increasingly looses to the method of  
elections.  
Rather than focusing on the results lot causes in deliberative bodies, I want to focus on the 
qualities it brings out in the citizen. I am thus not so much looking for outcome of  better informed 
decisions, but the ability to make decisions itself. I will not deal in this paper with the question of  how 
deliberative bodies were given information and what they were presented with, or whether the 
deliberative process is manipulative or informative, or both. Instead I will focus on the qualities 
associated with the politics of  elections and sortition. Or, in other words, instead of  focusing on recent 
works in political science, like discussing Bouricious’ design mentioned above, I focus on the history of  
theory regarding the respective methods of  lot and election for why the method of  elections was 
preferred to the method of  lot.  
 See the following articles:  31
McDonald, Henry. "Ireland becomes first country to legalise gay marriage by popular vote." The Observer. Guardian News 
and Media, 23 May 2015. Web. 30 Apr. 2017. 
Landemore, Hélène. "Iceland Tried to Crowdsource a New Constitution. It Didn’t Work." Slate Magazine. Slate, 31 July 
2014. Web. 30 Apr. 2017.
 Bouricius, Terril G. (2013) „Democracy Through Multi-Body Sortition: Athenian Lessons for the Modern Day,“ Journal 32
of Public Deliberation: Vol. 9, Iss. 1, Article 11. 
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I will argue that the increasing preference for election as opposed to lot amplifies the principle of  
distinction between those that govern and those that are governed. The distinction between those that 
govern and those that are governed derives, not, out of  a necessity to allocate certain administrative 
posts, but out of  the elective method itself. This implies that political freedom to act is only given to 
those that are distinguished. Lot, on the contrary, makes no use of  the principle of  distinction, still, in 
modern republics there are only a certain number of  political positions available. Hannah Arendt will 
take this problem up, however, not with reference to sortition. It will therefore be worthwhile to try 
sortition in Arendt’s politics writings and see whether it would, as she accused elections, corrupt political 
freedom.  
I will argue that sortition does not disenchant the citizen from those that govern, but rather 
educates both on matters of  the citizen as well as on matters of  the public. Sortition has the effect of  
bringing the unexpected, individual knowledge base of  the individual citizen to the public. This 
certainly begs the question what we expect from the individual citizen that has been drawn at random. 
Nothing but their opinion. Drawing on Arendt, the bodies of  government where political opinion is 
produced, are those where lot should be applied.  
In short, I hope that, however strange we might find the method of  lot, we will also understand 
why the people of  Ancient Athens thought its use worthwhile. And that that there may be reasons to 
consider institutionalizing popular government within the checks and balances of  a federal republic, 
even if  doing so only adds one more source of  power to the political landscape; following 
Montesquieu’s insight that the more sources of  power a government has, the freer will be it’s citizens.  
 IX
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Introduction 
	  
	 The modern nation state suffers under democratic fatigue. Characteristic of  this fatigue is 
decreasing citizen participation, low voter turnouts and increasing frustration with the elected 
representatives and politics in general. People are reluctant to participate in elections, especially on a 
local level, and on a federal level do not think their votes count as much, which, in the case of  United 
States, is not untrue, if  one lives in a predominantly blue or red state. As has been shown in the preface, 
this political fatigue may be caused by a distinction between those that can act politically and those that 
cannot not. In representative democracies it are usually the representatives that act politically and the 
represented that do not, or only do so on election day.  
	 Looking at the American political landscape there may be, however, another symptom at work, 
beside political fatigue. In fact, following the bi-partisan divide, neither side seems especially fatigued. 
Rather the struggle of  these factions appears to be stronger and ever more demanding. Those that are 
politically active, seem to be more active then ever, handing out petitions, creating clear distinctions of  
membership, repeating their political views and interests on any and every occasion. Shootings become 
a place for the anti-gun lobby, crime a place for those that “support guns,” “our troops” are supported 
by either side. Social media is full of  little two minute commercials on what views to hold on what and 
the political Op-Ed usually more in search of  increasing membership to the authors political siding, 
than the expression of  a puzzled, or unique personal opinion. 
	 On the one hand, political science indicates a decline in citizen participation in politics overall. 
On the other hand, those that are active in politics, let them be citizens or politicians, seem more 
engaged then ever. This engagement, however follows clear lines of  us vs. them, an antagonism that 
may have caused the less passionate to fatigue.  
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	 On face value it seems that only those that have a clear political interest, nowadays, are 
participating in politics and that these participants are adamant about their interest. But if  it is only 
those that have a clear political interest that are politically active, that means in turn, that all politics, 
nowadays, seem to be based on interests.  
	 The focus on political interests makes sense considering how in a representative democracy 
interest become political via elections. In order to win an election one needs votes. Any political interest, 
or any person with a political interest, therefore is in need of  persuading others of  the importance of  
this interest. Only if  a majority of  people support this interest, their representative will come into 
power, that is office. That means, that politically interests become stronger, the more people support 
them, or, to turn the phrase around, the more aggregate the political interest the stronger its power, 
which is why those people, that are active in politics, are so eager to expand membership to their cause.  
	 The elective system demands that interests exist in a aggregate state. Aggregation means that 
these interests need to be homogenized to speak to as many people at once without speaking to them 
less then the opposing narrative of  the opposition party. What is of  political interest for some locality, 
also needs to be made politically interesting for another locality, so as to summon their votes. 	 T h e 
need for a broad narrative to reach a broad spectrum of  voters stands in contradiction to the specific 
political experience of  the individual voter. To reach resonance in the political experience of  most will 
lower the chances of  reaching full resonance with any. Therefore the speech involved in politics of  
interests is usually not one of  individual experience or diversity, but one of  homogeneity and power-
play. 
	 Political speeches serve to reify allegiance by relying on predetermined symbols the members 
know by heart, while at the same time repeating membership by scapegoating those that are of  the 
other team. There is no community of  all. There are those that are politically active and those that are 
not active. And even those that are active shut themselves of  into competitive and aggressive interest 
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groups. Such competitive mentality may be another reason why some have fatigued of  the 
representative democratic process. The projection of  difference in this competition is constructed 
through narratives of  morality, through the rhetoric of  winning and loosing, through strategy and 
allegiance of  minority parties against other minority or majority parties. The minority is loosing to the 
interest of  the majority, forcing everyone to live under that interest. In turn minority parties form 
allegiances to achieve majority, thereby dealing away with the locality of  their interests so as to increase 
membership, which may, in the extreme, cause citizens even to vote against their own interest. Even 
worse it can cause them to vote against their own interests but falsify the effect of  voting by replacing 
interests of  different localities, allowing citizens to choose along the lines of  policy that will not affect 
them. 
	 But voting for someone who fights for one’s interest, or voting for a party who’s political vision 
one finds interesting is the way in which representative democracy operates. The citizens make their 
views known through voting, and the voting system homogenizes their views into aggregate, preferably 
majority positions. This is a dilemma because it has split the citizenry between those that are animated 
by the system of  interests and those that are fatigued by it. It has split the in a sense the community that 
is supposed to be made of  the people of  the nation. Or, in other words, the elective system seems to 
speak to only those with clear political interests within party politics, and in turn gives them a voice, but 
those that have a more diverse political experience outside of  this elective system are left out of  the 
politics en gross. 
	 One may respond that being left out by this system is their own fault, politics is about power, 
and all they have to do is organize to make themselves heard. But organizing to make themselves heard 
would immediately recreate the structure of  elective politics and again silence the individual voice. The 
dilemma therefore seems to lie within the system of  elections, which only gives voice to interests not 
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community. Which begs the question whether there is any other way of  choosing representatives in the 
republican tradition, that could “represent” those that are left out by elections?  
	 Sortition would be another way of  choosing representatives that would give voice to the diverse 
and individual experience of  the citizen. Sortition is the method of  choosing representatives by lot, that 
is by chance. Not relying on the hierarchical structure of  elections, sortition has no need to homogenize 
the individual political experience into an aggregate state of  political interest. Rather, it allows the 
temporary elevation of  the individual to a public persona, so as to allow this individual to try themselves 
as political being and so that the public may hear diverse and personal experiences of  the citizens 
chosen and thereby experience community. Or, in other words: Introducing sortition besides elections 
would diversify political opinion and complicate the competition of  political interests and in turn create 
something like tolerance for the diversity of  the members of  the American community.  
	 Ancient Athens is the case par excellence to understand how sortition worked in an political 
environment.  
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Chapter I 
 While modern American government relies heavily on elections, the Athenian approach relied 
on a process of  sortition. Randomly selected citizens would serve in a given public office, in an effort to 
represent the cities population on administrative or juristic tasks. Random selection was not influenced 
by skill, party alliance, public promise, or the consent of  the voter. Instead, the only prerequisite was to 
be part of  the community of  citizens. And the selection for office was truly based on chance, which 
speaks to the trust the Athenians had in this community. Being chosen by chance allowed for the 
temporary elevation of  the individual to a public persona, but the individual still was part of  the 
community. From the perspective of  a modern reader one may ask: How could this system operate? 
And how can this process of  sortition be considered democratic? 
 The historical development of  democracy in Ancient Athens complicates how sortition was 
considered democratic. Sortition was a way of  allocating individuals to offices within a specific political 
institution— but it was the power of  this institutional body that made sortition politically significant. 
Since the relationships between political bodies changed frequently, the power of  sortition within the 
democracy did as well. Therefore it is in order to look at sortition in the time frame after the 
development of  democracy.  
In order to locate the beginning of  democracy it is necessary to define what democracy is. One 
definition, following Josia Ober, is “demokratia is the celebration by the demos of  a way of  life centered 
on the freedom of  the citizen and political equality.”  Ober understands democracy as deriving, not 33
sufficiently but at least substantially, from the identity of  a citizen as “demos,” and the subsequent will 
of  this demos to be a politically active entity.  According to Ober the way the demos participated 34
 Ober, "'I Besieged," in Princeton/Stanford Working, 1033
 Ibid,. 634
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politically was characterized by freedom and equality, in the sense that the citizen was equal in his 
potential of  influencing policy, and free in the sense of  having the power to do so.   3536
A unified demos was first experienced by the political elite in the events of  508/7 B.C. and thus 
marks, for Ober, the beginning of  Democracy. Ober argues, that expelling the Spartan King with 300 
Warriors, and his Athenian Allies, was the first time in Greek history that "demos” acted unified on the 
conception of  itself  being an Athenian political force.  “It”, the demos , then nullified the expulsion via 37
ostracism of  Cleisthenes and his followers, who became, or maybe already was, the elite advocate for 
democracy.  Therefore democracy was born out of  the sudden emancipation of  the demos, acting 38
politically (expelling the foreigners and their allies) and thus gaining krate (power).  
Daniela Cammack takes up the two intriguing aspects of  this narrative, namely the demos, as 
being referred to as a single entity, (“it” in English) and - responding to what puzzled Ober -the absence 
of  a leader figure in the uprising of  the demos in 508/7 B.C.  She explains that throughout Ancient 39
Greek texts the demos is referred to as either a singular collective agent, an independent political agent, 
or partial agents.  Cammack thus wonders what “demos” meant, if  “it" acted in singular verb forms, if  40
“it” had political agency, or if  “it” often excluded the elite. She concludes that demos signified a 
corporation, in the sense of  signifying an Assembly of  lower class citizens. Democracy then simply meant 
that the Assembly received power, that is, - the demos received krate.   41
 since only free, male Athenian had political power in Ancient Athens the third person male singular is appropriate. 35
 Ober, "'I Besieged," in Princeton/Stanford Working, 1036
 Ibid., 637
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Daniela Cammack agrees with Ober that the events of  508/7 marked the beginning of  
democracy, not because of  a sudden emancipation of  the lower class under a collective identity, but 
because of  a shift in power towards the Assembly. She writes:  
Cleisthenes, were are told, ‘took the demos into his hetaireia’ (perhaps best translated 
‘fraternity’) and ‘drew the demos to his side’, thus gaining the advantage over his rival 
Isagoras (a Athenian ally of  Sparta). … I would alter Ober’s wording. What Herodotus 
tells us is not that it was in the Assembly that Cleisthenes allied himself  to the demos, but 
simply that Cleisthenes allied himself  to the demos, i.e. to the Assembly - and thence, by 
extension, to the common people at large.  42
The birth of  democracy, therefore, simply describes the political center of  gravity shifting from a small 
Council of  elites towards the larger crowd in the Assembly. This shift may presuppose a democratic 
identity, or an emancipation of  the demos. But it was not the sudden creation of  identity that brought 
about democracy, but rather the literal transfer of  making a decision concerning the Spartan invasion 
not with the elites, but with the demos. With the demos becoming at once both the source of  power and 
the crowd of  peers, another wording for democracy may have been simply that the community gained 
power.   43
This singular moment which describes the beginning of  democracy also defines it, but it does 
not necessarily explain its duration.  For democracy to continue the demos would have to be involved 44
in almost all decisions of  Greek politics. This could only be done if  the principles of  the Assembly, 
which later became the principles of  democracy, extended to all other political offices. In other words, 
the principles of  democracy, as the celebration of  equality and freedom, had to continue also in the 
administration of  the state and remain with the community, the demos. Only one way of  allocating 
political offices allowed for these principles to continue, and that was sortition. 
 Ibid., 1742
 Compare Ober, Mass and Elite, 35.43
 Compare Ober, "'I Besieged," in Princeton/Stanford Working, 11.44
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Sortition allowed for the principles of  the assembly, equality and freedom, to extend into 
different “institutions” that had a share in the administration of  Ancient Athens. As sortition is central 
to understanding democracy, it is important to ask who specifically had access to these institutions and 
in what manner political business within these institutions was administered.  Or, more simply put, 45
who decided what, when was it decided, and where? 
	 In his essay, On the Election by Lot, James Wycliff  Headlam notes how “…a Greek had no doubt 
what he meant by a democracy; it was a city in which the people gathered together at a definite place in 
one large visible Assembly governed the state.”  Contrary to how we perceive democracy today, as 46
abstract and removed, in ancient Greece it was a tangible experience. Ten times a year meetings in the 
Ekklesia took place, including some 4000 to 8000 citizens. Citizens met in a central space of  a town, 
situated on top of  a hill, widely visible from the city down below and open to all those who were 
eligible. Likewise, the exercise of  power was an actual experience. “The demos to an Athenian was a 
concrete thing which he had often seen and heard: it was the εκκλησια.“  This wording may be a little 47
confusing, because Eκκλησια simply signified the positive political aspect of  the demos, that in itself  
described a mass meeting.  Eκκλησια translates to those summoned from, or called out of, „typically 48
following a formal call-out (ekkaleô, ‘call out’ or ‚summon’).”  Today we translate Eκκλησια to “church,” 49
which is telling, for it helps us to understand the social significance of  the meeting. Like going to church, 
going to the Ekklesia was a community - and therefore a political event.  
 Since these institutions developed over time I will limit my scope of inquiry to the time of Aristotle and his exact 45
contemporary Demosthenes (384-322). In order to understand how these institutions worked I will follow both the wording 
used by contemporaries to describe the political processes and the relationships of the institutions towards each other. This 
approach allows for both nominal and historic arguments respectively. 
 James Wycliffe Headlam, Election by Lot in Athens, prince consort dissertation, 1890 ed., Cambridge Historical Essays iv 46
(London: Cambridge UP, 1891), 29.
 Ibid., 29.47
 Cammack, "The Dêmos," 648
 Mogens Herman Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles, and Ideology 49
(Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1999), 129.
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	 Becoming a citizen and appearing in public at the Ekklesia was a political process that affirmed 
as much positively as negatively who belonged to the Athenian community. Each male person over the 
age of  twenty could sit in the Assembly if  they were registered in their respective districts (demes), had 
completed their introduction to the military, and did not have a record of  any criminal activity. The 
districts were combined into ten tribes (prytany), and in each district a father would introduced their son 
to citizenship by asking their fellow citizens of  that district to vote on whether they believed that their 
son was a true Athenian.  The initiation of  becoming a citizen, therefore, was in Ancient Athens 50
already a political moment that involved the judgment of  neighbors. The trust that Athenians exercised 
through sortition, therefore, was not blind. It occurred after an communal initiation, one in which an 
small scale, electoral process took place. 
	 The prerequisites for becoming an Athenian citizen changed over time. The overall tendency, 
however, was to base citizenship on ancestry and social standing. Women, slaves, those who had been 
convicted of  a crime, and those who refused military service, were all excluded from becoming true 
citizens. At one point, both parents of  a given candidate needed to be Athenian citizens, a prerequisite 
which sought to keep the merchant elites from overpopulating the public arena. Thus, as Ober suggests, 
the citizenry had a strong identity.  
Within this political space, sortition was a way to extend the principles of  the assembly, equality 
and freedom, into different parts of  government. Athenians used voting to measure the popularity of  
policy proposals or judicial decisions, not to allocate representatives. It was common procedure in the 
Council, as well as in the General Assembly or the Courts, to vote as a simple way of  reaching a 
commonly supported decision.  The people making a decision, however, had been allocated randomly 51
by the method of  sortition. The device used to randomly select citizens was called Kleroterion. The 
Kleroterion was a machine built of  stone and wood, in which different colored marbles would randomly 
Ibid., 129. & Ober, Mass and Elite, 69.50
 Ober, Mass and Elite, 71.51
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fall on a given citizens token. In order to participate, citizens had to meet varying age requirements. 
Participation in this roulette was voluntary, or in the Greek, - ho boulemous, all those wishing. This process 
took place in the Ekklesia, a form of  demos in itself  (following Cammack’s insight from above). To leave 
political power to those wishing and randomly chosen stands testament to the trust Athenians must 
have had in their community. Community was build through this trust, rather than the common process 
of  choosing representatives through voting.  
By the Age of  Demosthenes, specifically between 384-22 B.C., the institutional landscape of  
Athenian political life consisted of  four distinct bodies: the Popular Assembly (ekklesia), the Magistracies 
(archai), the Council (boule), and the Courts (dikasteria).  Except for the popular Assembly, all other 52
institutions used randomly selected representatives either exclusively or alongside the method of  
elections.  The council, the courts, and the magistrate were randomly selected from a volunteering 53
population. Only a few magistracies were allocated by elections, mostly for positions that demanded 
high expertise.  While the Assembly and Courts relied on large crowds, the Council and Magistrates 54
actively used sortition to reflect the community.   55
	 The General Assembly in Ekklesia decided on questions of  policy, publicity, and public 
administration.  It also evaluated the performance of  all those that had received a particular task by 56
the community. Usually orators would present the policy in question and the assembled citizens would 
subsequently vote, so that “the demos” made his will known.  This process of  listening and deciding 57
was expressed by the word bouleuomai and it signified not merely “thinking” but also always “coming to a 
 Hansen, The Athenian, 230.52
 Ibid., 230 and 248.53
 Hansen, The Athenian, 225-244.54
 Compare Ober, "'I Besieged," in Princeton/Stanford Working, 10.55
 Ober, Mass and Elite, 132-138.56
 Hansen, The Athenian, 125-150.57
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decision that was within the institutions or groups power.”  It did not mean deliberating in the sense 58
that all participants spoke or discussed, but rather bouleuomai meant “decision making,”  which is makes 59
sense given the large number of  participants. On account if  its size, the Assembly could not efficiently 
deal with the day-to-day task that came about in managing the state. Thus some administrative power 
was delegated to a Council of  400 citizens, and later after Solon it was 500 citizens, and 700 
magistrates.  Six hundred out of  these seven hundred magistrates and the whole Council were chosen 60
by sortition.  Thus, the process of  sortition was a way of  delegating administrative tasks. Most of  the 61
power around decision making, however, was centered in the general assembly.  62
	 The purpose of  the Council was to provide structure to the General Assembly, without 
overbearing its political power.  The Council prepared the Agenda for the General Assembly and 63
executed its decrees.  In preparing the agenda the Council had the ability to control what would 64
become and not become a political issue for the demos. Historically, the function of  the counsel rose out 
of  the intra-elite competition in order to extert control over the decrees of  the General Assembly by 
setting the agenda.  However, at the time of  Demosthenes the Council was open to all citizens 65
regardless of  property qualification. Therefore it cannot be said that the elite controlled the agenda of  
the General Assembly.  66
 Daniela Cammack, "Not Talking but Thinking and Voting: Democratic Deliberation in Classical Athens," Yale University, 58
January 16, 2017, 14.
 Ibid., 6.59
 “…the Boulh was almost entirely a business body. Its duty was not to discuss questions of policy, nor to decide on 60
momentous matters; it had to dispose of the enormous mass of detailed business which was necessarily connected with the 
government of the state.” Headlam, Election by Lot in Athens, 68.
 Hansen, The Athenian, 230.61
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Additionally, the vetting process which councilmen and magistrates underwent did not conserve 
elitism but rather raised awareness of  their community. This vetting process, dokimasia, assessed whether 
a given candidate paid taxes and what their relationship was to their parents.  This examination was, 67
however, a mere formality. It in no way indented to weed out incompetence, as might be assumed.  68
The requirement to pay taxes did not systematically exclude any volunteering candidate. Instead, it was 
a public event that made the potential candidate again aware of  his community and those that vetted 
him for the special task of  administration.  
As the Councilmen presided over the General Assembly by executing probouleutic tasks, so did 
the magistrates preside over the courts.  The magistrates, like the councilors, had to meet the age 69
requirement of  30 years old. Out of  the 700 magistrates, 600 were chosen by the process of  sortition. 
The other one hundred were chosen by vote.  Similar to the councilmen, all the magistrates were more 70
administrators than rulers.  They called meetings, prepared business, and presided over and put 71
motions to vote. Thus they channeled the citizen’s motion to the a decisive authority. 
Like the councilmen the magistrates rarely decided but rather advised the citizenry. The 
vocabulary used to describe the political power of  both councilors and magistrates speaks to this fact. 
The word commonly used for the “deliberative process” in the Council was “bouleuô, ‘plan’ or, as noted 
above, ‘perform Council activity’,
 
and probouleuô, ‘pre-plan’…”, only rarely bouleuomai.  Cammack 72
considers the numerous mentions of  “planing” as proof  that the Council did in fact not decide on 
 Also: All councilmen had to be at least 30 years old and no one could be councilor two years in a row. They also 67
represented the 139 demes that comprised the city. See Hansen, The Athenian, 248.
  Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997), 12.68
 Hansen, The Athenian, 229. & Ober, Mass and Elite, 132-141.69
 Hansen, The Athenian, 227.70
 Aristotle, et al., Aristotle: The Politics and the Constitution of Athens, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 113.71
 Cammack, "Not Talking," 16.72
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certain issues. The Council and Magistrates, rather devised plans to address these issues or anticipate 
them. The decisive power still lay with the Assembly. 
It is worthwhile to spend some time on the question of  finance and expertise, because it has 
been a point of  contestation how popular government in Ancient Athens secured monetary 
administration.  Some post concerning financial administration were filled by citizens of  the higher 73
rank of  society through property qualifications and subsequent voting. Other posts could be created by 
the expert himself, if  he persuaded the Assembly of  its necessity and adequacy. Still, no law or decision 
could be made without the concurrence of  the General Assembly, in which the matter had to be 
discussed.  Most financial questions therefore, were answered by the aid of  orators in the General 74
Assembly.  
It was the role of  the experts to be orators that took to advising the citizenry.  The orators were 75
considered the political elite in certain respects. Manin describes how “…the practice (in Ancient 
Athens) was to speak of  orators and generals (rhetoric kai strategoi) in the same breath.”  Considering 76
orators and generals as an natural duo suggests that they were considered to belong to the same group 
of  “political leaders.” However, as Manin further suggest, the fact that they were banned to the 
“outskirts” of  the political process hints at the limits of  their power. The orators inhabited roles that 
were merely advisory, speaking to the deep distrust the Athenians felt toward the elite.  77
Cases of  distrust toward Councilmen, Orators or Magistrates were solved by the Courts and 
thereby again by the community. The Courts embodied the playing field on which this competition was 
 Headlam, Election by Lot in Athens, 112.73
 Hansen, The Athenian, 234.74
 Headlam, Election by Lot in Athens, 114.75
 Manin, The Principles, 14.76
 Manin wrote: “The absence of experts or, at any rate, their restricted role was designed to safeguard the political power of 77
ordinary citizens.” Ibid., 32.
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executed.  Councilman, Orators and Magistrates all could be tried on appeal in the Courts, either 78
while in office, or during the time they had to “render account”.  Certainly the Courts had some 79
administrative powers, like witnessing contracts and auctions of  public works, or trying complains by 
people selected for military duty, but most of  all the courts dealt with political accusations against 
magistrates or councilors.  Access to the courts was limited to the more experienced citizens, who had 80
sworn to judge justly. Like the magistrates jurors had to be at least 30 years old. Each year 6000 
potential jurors were drawn from the general citizenry. These jurors were made to swear the Heliastic 
Oath which reads as follows: “I will cast my vote in consonance with the laws and with the decrees 
passed by the Assembly and by the Council, but, if  there is no law, in consonance with my sense of  
what is most just, without favor or enmity. I will vote on the matters raised in the charge, and I will 
listen impartially to accusers and defenders alike.”  Thus the courts upheld, in all cases possible, the 81
laws and decrees of  the Assembly and council. However, in cases of  tort, the citizen was trusted to listen 
impartially to the arguments presented. As such, the courts were again an institution of  the community. 
The large number of  jurors, as well as their random allocation to different courts, resulted in a 
certain level of  anonymity which helped the jurors judge impartially.  On a given day when the court 82
was in session, from these 6000 a specific number was chosen by sortition. From those chosen the 
process of  sortition placed jurors in specific courts. There are examples of  panels of  1001, 1501, 2001, 
and 2501 jurors for political trials.  It was therefore difficult for any citizen to influence the jurors 83
individually. The jurors could also not be influenced easily as a whole by those trained in rhetoric, 
because the citizen accused had to personally defend himself. There was no official prosecutor, cases 
 Hansen, The Athenian, 179. Ober, Mass and Elite, 141-148.78
 Manin, The Principles, 12, 13, 33.79
 Private legal quarrels would usually be settled by arbitration.80
 Hansen, The Athenian, 182.81
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had to be brought and argued by ordinary citizens.  If  fact, it was a punishable offense to have 84
someone else argue on one’s behalf.  These methods were effective- the juror was protected by 85
anonymity while each defendant equally represented their own case.  
Involving 6000 jurors between 175 and 225 times a year put a financial constraint on all jurors. 
The Courts sat usually for a whole day, which meant 9½ hours derived from the shortest day in the year 
judging up to 4 cases a day.  The Athenians resolved the financial constraint caused by the frequency 86
of  these judicial sessions by paying each juror 3 obols a day for his services, which was half  of  what one 
received by attending the General Assembly.  This may suggest that mainly the poor had an incentive 87
to sit in Court, however, 3 obols was far below the average daily wage of  a worker.  Therefore, Hansen 88
suggests that mostly the elderly, those whose physical ability deprived them of  executing hard labor, sat 
in court.  He invokes the image of  sons and grandsons helping their family elder to court.  89 90
With the magistrate preparing the cases, all three entities, the jurors, the defendant and the 
magistrate, had no judicial expertise. As Hansen wrote: “Thus, a law-case at Athens was a play with 
three characters, all amateurs: the citizen who brought the charge, the magistrate who prepared the 
case and presided over the courts, and the jury who heard the case and gave judgement.”  This lack of  91
professional involvement, guaranteed the rule of  the demos in the courts, as opposed to the rule of  
some judicial elite. Therefore again, the community ruled itself  also in questions of  the law. 
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All institutions that had decisive power in Ancient Athens were those that involved mass 
participation. Following the idea of  “democracy,” all power remained with the demos. Because of  this 
power Ober calls the demos free in a political context. But it is the aspect of  equality, Ober mentions in 
his definition of  democracy, that is more intriguing. Certainly some members of  the demos became 
councilman or magistrates or jurors and others didn’t. How then were they considered equal to one 
another?  
Sortition allowed the principles of  equality to prevail even in events of  distinction and that, as 
such, the demos “remained” politically free.  The demos taken as a single entity, may suggest equality 92
in the abstract, or equality in the assembly, but not equality of  the individual. When some became 
Councilors and others did not how were they equal? Simply said: equality seems to cease when any 
form of  distinction is present. However, if  equality exists when equals are treated equal, and unequals 
unequal, then equality ceases to exist when unequals are treated equal. As Manin points out this can be 
easily understood in mathematical terms where we assume that a/b=a/b, and a/B=a/B, but not a/
B=a/b.  Such an idea of  equality always forces the arbitrator’s to adjust equality to unequals.   93 94
The Greeks solved this problem of  “adjustment” by handing it to an agent that was qua 
definition impartial, namely chance and based whether one wanted to be judged by this agent on 
whether one wanted to participate in politics.  This form of  equality (Isegoria) was based on 95
voluntarism.  It was the individual that made itself  equal, not the masses. The willingness to be treated 96
as an equal, which was the willingness to speak up, or to put one’s name down for the draw, created 
equality. Sortition therefore was the random allocation of  all those willing.  
 Manin, the Principles, 41.92
 Ibid., 40.93
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This form of  equality was inspired by the General Assembly.  The procedure of  speaking up in 97
the General Assembly was a two stage process "of  volunteering to be heard” and then “to be called 
upon.” Holding 4000 to 8000 people, later even up to 20,000 and being situated on top of  a hill made 
it acoustically a challenging to speak up.  Certainly not everybody spoke, but even those that did faced 98
a large audience, and due to the winds from the valley below had to shout. Thus, even thought 
everybody could technically access the podium and speak, mostly those that were skilled in public 
speech took the chance. When Manin points out that banning the elites to the outskirts of  the political 
process showed a deep distrust the Athenian demos had toward them, this divide seemed to have been 
underlined by the physical implications of  the setting of  the General Assembly in the Ekklesia. 
Nevertheless, technically, every participant in the Assembly had a right to speak up, that is, go up to the 
podium and address the demos.  Whether one gained access depended on whether on was seen, that is 99
called upon. One could argue that personal connections may have been the deciding factor, but the 
amount of  people present makes that unlikely.  Rather, whether one was called upon or not may have 100
felt like it was dependent on chance.   101
Manin suggests that the two stage process “of  volunteering to be heard" and then "to be called 
upon” was the same praxis that inspired the Athenians to use sortition in other political bodies.  E.g. 102
In order to become a court member or a councilman, one had to put one’s name in a Kleroterion. 
Thus here again a twofold process of  first voluntary participation and secondly random selection 
characterized the allotment of  offices. The equal probability of  being called on was reiterated by the 
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drawing of  lots, because those wanting to attain public office, here again, first had to make a choice of  
putting their name up for the draw. Only secondly did they come under the concept of  equality by 
having an equal chance to be drawn. The equality (Isegoria) in the General Assembly was thus reiterated 
in the allocation of  offices by the method of  sortition. 
Sortition enabled the Greeks to transfer Isegoria - freedom and equality - they had found in the 
empowered demos to the other offices of  the state. As Headlam wrote: “It remains however true that 
the prime reason for the maintenance of  the lot was that, so long as offices were filled by it, the full 
supremacy of  the Assembly over Council and administration was secured.”  Since appointment by lot 103
meant appointment by chance, no representative could justify challenging the supremacy of  the 
General Assembly and thereby the community. The representative chosen by lot was not considered 
better or worse than his peers, but was in fact just one of  them. Conversely, sortition was a way of  
delegating power that would not discriminate any other way then if  the matter had to be discussed in 
the General Assembly. 
Distinct offices did not so much elevate the individual but the community as a whole. Ober 
writes:  
The symbolic value of  ordinary citizens conducting all levels of  state business must have 
been considerable. The awe that an Athenian might feel upon confronting a magistrate 
(…) would now be a function of  the office itself, not of  the private status of  the 
officeholder. Awe would therefore be ascribed to the reflected grandeur of  the sate, 
which the magistrate in some sense symbolized.  104
The grandeur of  the state was immediately reflected in the grandeur of  the community. This grandeur 
resulted not only from the diminishing mystique of  public office, but also from the quantity of  people 
involved and the subsequent knowledge of  governing. Since offices could only be held one year in a row, 
 Headlam, Election by Lot in Athens, 39.103
 Ober, Mass and Elite, 80.104
   18
a majority of  citizens would serve at least once over their lifetime.  This rotational principle must have 105
had a considerable educational effect on the citizenry.  
	 Elections did not suggest themselves to the Athenians. The process of  elections would have 
created an unwanted distinction between those governing and not governing, as well as effectively invite 
less people into office. Instead, “…the rotation requirement [carried] no risk of  thwarting the logic of  
lot.”  However, the rotation requirement did thwart the logic of  elections, because their was not good 106
reason why someone who did well in office should not continue to do so, even beyond their one year 
service. Generally, to run a campaign for one year of  service would not be cost efficient. Systematically 
speaking, therefore, the rotation requirement of  Athenian democracy made elections undesirable.  
	 Furthermore, the concept of  Isegoria is not compatible with the method of  elections. While 
elections rely on a variety of  factors to decide the outcome of  a campaign, be it merit or wealth, Isegoria 
allows the discriminating principle to be chance. Elections do not reiterate the possibility of  equality 
within the population. Contrarily, they create distinction between candidate and voter. The hierarchical 
distinction between candidate and voter, however, would have risked the egalitarian legitimacy of  the 
Athenian community. Returning to the introduction to this paper, Sortition in Ancient Athens offered a 
way of  temporarily elevating the individual to a public persona. It allowed for this individual to try 
himself  as political being and it allowed for the public to hear diverse and personal experiences of  the 
citizens chosen.  This elevation was not much different than taking the floor in the Assembly, except 107
for the fact, that sortition would allow this elevating to be transferred into smaller political bodies. The 
elevation resulting from Isegoria was both empowering (free) and egalitarian and therefore the principle 
of  democracy.  
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	 The use of  sorption in Ancient Athens is indicative of  the state of  communal trust Athenians 
had in each other. Since the central principle of  sortition is chance, no Athenian could consider himself  
better or worse than his peers by being appointed or denied office. In turn, since sortition chooses 
without any particular quality in mind, the Athenians must have had considerable trust in the members 
of  their community. The process of  sortition not only relies on this trust but also enables it. Certainly, 
rendering account and collegiality actively kept a given representative in constant connection to his 
community. More so, this chosen representative had to keep their private interests at bay. But it was, first 
of  all, a trust in the community that led an individual to decide to involve himself  in politics. This in 
itself  made sortition possible, and led to the continuation of  democracy.  
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Chapter II 
In the development of  modern representative government since Ancient Athens, sortition gave 
way to elections— despite or maybe even because of  the democratic character of  sortition itself. In 
Athens, sortition allowed for the demos to extend its reach into all offices under the principles of  
freedom and equality. In America today, sortition is at most still present in the jury system. By the time 
of  the ratification debate between federalists and anti-federalists surrounding the American 
Constitution, the process of  sortition finds not a single mention. Sortition was, however, part of  the 
republican tradition. Aristotle, as a contemporary, wrote about the use of  lot during his time. 
Montesquieu, who was interested in the necessary relations behind political conceptions, commented 
on the use of  lot in democracies and the use of  elections in aristocracies. Rousseau considered it 
worthwhile to discuss the properties of  lot in relation to his conception of  the social contract. And even 
Schmitt makes one last mention of  sortition, before sortition leaves the ideas of  republican thought. It is 
evident that somewhere in the republican tradition sortition was entirely replaced by elections.   108
Interestingly enough, the conception of  sortition became increasingly limited as the 
republication tradition progressed toward the ratification debate. This is apparent in the writings of  
Gueffry and Schmitt, where the main quality that distinguished sortition from elections, namely the 
impartiality it held towards the qualities of  representatives, served as the primary reason behind its 
inapplicability within a modern democracy. Their argument roughly suggested that, even though the 
people may be unfit to rule themselves, they were certainly fit enough to select their own rulers. The 
very fact that elections distinguished candidates form the populous, became, if  only rhetorically, the 
main argument for the use of  elections. It is intuitive, therefore, that the value of  community was lost to 
 The term ‘republican’ here is used in reference to the republic of America, which is reflected in the process of elections. 108
This is contrary to the agenda of the ‘demos’ or a democracy, which would be reflected in the use of sortition. The 
technicalities of this, however, will not be discussed at length in this project. 
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the priority of  private interests. This reasoning behind the use elections later becomes crystalized at the 
time of  the ratification debate.  
Additionally, as elections became favored over sortition, all those who thought about political 
representation focused on the qualities of  the representative rather than the qualities of  the citizen. 
Where as both Aristotle and Montesquieu centered their arguments around the creation of  a virtuous 
body politic— by developing positive notions in teaching citizens and upholding community—the 
founding fathers focused on a negative contract between the represented and the representative. This 
may be another sign indicative of  a movement away from community, and the quality of  all, toward the 
representation of  all and the the quality of  few.  
In order to understand the development that sortition underwent, it seems reasonable to start 
with a contemporary to Athenian Democracy and end with the ratification of  the American 
Constitution. Starting with Aristotle and ending with the ratification has the advantage of  paring 
political theory in both instances with actual constitutional practice.  
Aristotle, a contemporary Demosthenes (384-322 B.C.), did not clearly express in his writings a 
preference to one method of  choosing representatives over another. He writes that whatever form of  
appointing representatives is used is indicative (only) of  the form of  government to be achieved.  109
Sortition, for Aristotle, is linked to democracy, where as elections are linked to aristocracy and 
oligarchy.  Aristotle continues by suggesting that the difference between aristocracy and oligarchy is 110
one of  excellence and wealth.  Elections within an aristocracy are based on excellence, while in an 111
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oligarchy they are based on wealth.  Throughout his writings on this matter there is not, however, a 112
clear preference expressed for one method over another.  
Central to Aristotle’s writings on politics is the question of  how to become good, in the sense of  
acting good.  Given his own context, this question may have been inspired by the rule of  demos in 113
Ancient Athens. The Athenian community (or the demos) was only as good as its randomly chosen 
representatives. Excellence therefore was a not limited to a few, but a question for all. According to 
Aristotle, excellence is achieved through temperate living. The best society is based on “temperate 
living,” i.e. a society of  the middle class. Achieving this society is difficult. There is only one way to 
teach people to be excellent without making becoming excellent arduous, and that way is through law. 
However, in order to make good laws that teach people to live an excellent life from childhood on, one 
needs good legislatures.  
In Aristotle's writing, the need for good legislatures to make good laws revealed a circular 
dilemma based on the causality between good legislators and good laws. In order to have good 
legislatures, that is a person that rules well, the legislature has to first be a good citizen, a person that is 
ruled well.  However, a person can only be ruled well by good laws.  This principle called eleuthera - 114 115
ruling and being ruled in turn - exemplifies the causality dilemma: “which came first, the good ruler or 
the good law?” No clear starting point can be found in Aristotle’s writing.  
Assuming a relationship between merit and excellence one could hypothetically argue that 
Aristotle favored elections. In relation to the difference between sortition and elections, one could 
assume that in a political context the excellent citizen and the candidate of  merit are not that different. 
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In order to be a good legislature one had to be first a good citizen (eleutheria).  In aristocracies, 116
elections are based on merit.  Aristoi means the best, maybe therefore also the best candidate. One 117
could presume, since Aristotle bases aristocracy on excellence, that the elective process achieves finding 
the best citizens—but this assumption is de facto not de juro. It is therefore unclear which method of  
appointment Aristotle preferred in creating an excellent society. 
In linking sortition with democracy and elections with aristocracy, Aristotle influenced many 
other considerations on representative government the republican tradition. For example, Montesquieu, 
like Aristotle, links the method of  lot with democracy and the method of  elections with aristocracy. He 
writes:  
The suffrage by lot is natural to democracy; as that by choice is to aristocracy. The 
suffrage by lot is a method of  electing that offends no one, but animates each citizen 
with the pleasing hope of  serving his country. Yes, as this method is in itself  defective, 
it has been the endeavor of  the most eminent legislators to regulate and ament 
it. ’  118 119
Montesquieu mentions directly the two principles central to democracy, namely freedom and equality. 
Lot is natural to democracy because it does not cause any exterior distinction between citizens; rather, it 
equalizes the chance of  each citizen to serve in office. In turn, this equality animates each citizen to 
serve. The defect of  sortition lies in precisely the fact that it does not distinguish, in the sense that it does 
not give preference to a certain person for a certain position in office. Subsequently, Montesquieu 
mentions the laws implemented by Solon.  These laws ensured that military and financial offices were 120
filled with those most adequate to do so, namely the trained and the rich. This disregard of  
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professionals in specific offices can arguably be corrected by putting specific offices up for elections, or 
introducing certain prerequisites for candidacy.   121
Nevertheless, Montesquieu assumes that generally people are not in a position to govern 
themselves. He writes that “As most citizens have sufficient ability to choose, though unqualified to be 
chosen, so the people, though capable of  calling others to an account for their administration, are 
incapable of  conducting the administration themselves.”  The French for “choose” and “be chosen” is 122
“élire” and “être élus” respectively. However, “élire” is not the word Montesquieu uses when he says 
that aristocracies use choice. Instead, he uses the noun “choix.” The corresponding noun to “élire” 
would be "élit" (like the English elite), and the corresponding verb to “choix” would be choisir (to 
choose). The ones chosen then, are the elite, as opposed to “choissant,” those choosing. This suggests 
that the elite therefore is created by the choosing.  
Montesquieu suggests that the distinction between the elite and those choosing is not so much 
based on skill, or practicality. Instead, Montesquieu suggests that the elite are competitive whereas the 
people are passionate.  The English translation from the quote above reads as “incapable of  123
conducting the administration themselves” and reads in the French as: “…(le peuble) n’est pas propre à 
gérer par lui-même.” “Propre a gérer” means something like “properly waging,” or “properly 
managing.” Including the people, the phrase could be translated as: “…the people are not proper to 
manage (or wage) themselves. Another translation, which would emphasize the “par lui-même” would 
read: “…the people are not proper for managing themselves.” The reason why the people are not 
proper for managing themselves is because they act passionately. The elite, or “those chosen”, do not so 
much act passionately as the they act competitively. To act competitively is on the basis of  interests. The 
reason why the people are not equipped to manage themselves is because they do not have interests, but 
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rather passions.  It is a tremendous insight of  Montesquieu to claim that the people act according to 124
passion and the elite, or rather the aristocracy, act accord to their interests.  By linking political 125
interests with aristocracy, Montesquieu subsequently links these interests with the method of  
elections.   126
The people being inadequate to manage themselves is not the only reason for elections.  127
Another reason for why aristocracy uses elections is based on the preexistence of  an elite. Montesquieu 
writes, 
They do not here [in an aristocracy] choose by lot, for this would be productive of  
inconveniences only. And indeed, in a government where the most mortifying distinctions 
are already established, though they were to be chosen by lot, still they would not cease to 
be odious; it is the nobleman they envy, and not the magistrate.  128
A magistrate chosen by sortition in an aristocracy would be an inconvenience to government. The 
noblemen is still superior and the distinction between nobles and citizens prevalent. Sortition could 
therefore not “equalize” this society, because the envy for nobility would still exist. In turn, the 
advantages sortition has in a democracy (of  neither discriminating nor humiliating those that are not 
chosen) are still its disadvantages in an aristocracy.  129
The obvious distinction between the aristocracy and the people is not interrupted by the method 
of  elections to allocate political office. Montesquieu seems to assume that elections will keep this 
distinction alive, without particularly mentioning any constraints on possible candidates. The absence 
of, e.g. property qualifications, is striking in this context, because it simply suggests that elections, qua 
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definition, will keep the distinction between the elite and the people alive. This suggestion may have 
been inspired by the narrative of  Xenophon who related that even though the Ancient Roman people 
of  the lower classes had the chance and ability to elect one of  their own into office, they never did so. 
Montesquieu takes this to mean that in most cases people from the lower classes are simply not fit for 
government, but that they are wise enough to realize their own incapability. He thus suggests that the 
capability to govern is mostly thought to be found within the upper classes, even by the votes of  the 
lower classes. Basing elections on interests means that elections naturally keep these distinctions alive, 
and this is the reason why they are used in an aristocracy.  
Following the thought of  Aristotle and Montesquieu, Rousseau also pairs the method of  
sortition with democracy. Rousseau arrives at this conclusion from a different argument, however. He 
suggests that “…if  we bear in mind that the election of  rulers is a function of  government, and not of  
Sovereignty, we shall see why the lot is the method more natural to democracy, in which the 
administration is better in proportion as the number of  its acts is small.”  Rousseau suggests that the 130
method of  appointing representatives is not a power deriving from sovereignty, but a power deriving 
form government. In his conception of  the social contract government stands for administrative or 
executive power. Sovereignty, the power that remains with the people at all times, describes the exercise 
of  the “general will.”  This general will constitutes law (Book II, 1) and under the law everybody is 131
equal (Book II, 4). Now in a democracy, government is given to at least the majority of  people, as the 
term suggests. In that sense the sovereign - that is the general will of  the people - and the government - 
that is the administrative power of  the general will - are confined in the same body, the people. It is, 
however, dangerous, if  government and sovereignty are confined in the same body. Rousseau suggests 
that “…it is not good for him who makes the laws to execute them, nor for the body of  the people to 
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turn its attention away from general considerations to particular objects.”  The danger Rousseau sees 132
is that if  those that make the laws also execute the laws, they are likely to discriminate against the 
generality of  law. It is therefore best, as Rousseau states above, for a democracy to commit a few 
government acts as possible. 
The reason why democracy should commit as few acts as possible derives from the fallibility of  
men.  As Rousseau writes, “if  there were a people of  Gods, it would govern itself  democratically. 133
Such perfect government is not suited for men.”  Only Gods would be able to act as sovereign and 134
government at the same time because they would be able to distinguish their interests and thoughts as 
concerning the general views and particular views when acting as sovereign and government 
respectively. Acknowledging this, Manin concludes that “…this is beyond human capacity.”  Because 135
the people cannot, at the same time, act generally and particularly, they also cannot embody legislative 
and administrative tasks at the same time. Acknowledging this limitation, Rousseau suggests, would 
naturally lead to a limitation on the role government plays. 
In an aristocracy, the sovereign and the government are not confined in the same body. This is 
mainly because the aristocracy relies on majority voting. In an aristocracy, “…the prince chooses the 
prince, the government is preserved by itself, and voting is rightly ordered.”  The aristocracy as a form 136
of  government chooses itself. The General Will here finds expression by the counting of  votes, which 
Rousseau adds “…is rightly ordered.” In this case, “rightly ordered” refers to the principle that the 
general will is found in the majority.  “The prince choses the prince,” assumes that a distinctive 137
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principle relating aristocratic membership is already established, and that this distinctive principle tells 
sovereignty apart from government.  
The consent of  voting is the only method to transfer power from the sovereign to the 
government and therefore the only form of  legitimate government. However, this consent might very 
well be inspired by merit or talent. Rousseau suggests that… 
Election by lot would have few disadvantages in a real democracy, in which, as 
equality would everywhere exist in morals and talents as well as in principles and 
fortunes, it would become almost a matter of  indifference who was chosen. But I have 
already said that a real democracy is only an ideal.  138
A real democracy is, according to Rousseau, a society where morals and talents are distributed equally. 
It is a society where everyone’s ability is equal to everybody else’s. In that sense, in a real democracy 
choosing would not resemble a choice. Conversely, in a real society, talents and morals are not 
distributed equally. Since democracy cannot use the method of  lot, it has to use the method of  
elections, in order to concentrate these talents in government. Would the result then be an aristocracy? 
Rousseau distinguishes between three kinds of  aristocracy, which he labels as natural, elective 
and hereditary. He suggests that “…the first is only for simple peoples; the third is the worst of  all 
governments; the second is the best, and is aristocracy properly so called.”  By natural aristocracy 139
Rousseau means the natural increase of  experience by age, a certain form of  authority, that the first 
states - the family - were based on. Elective aristocracy explains itself  and refers to the original sense of  
the word aristoi, the best. The method of  elections then can identify this elective aristocracy. As 
Rousseau writes: “By this means (of  choosing) uprightness, understanding, experience, and all other 
claims to pre-eminence and public esteem become so many further guarantees of  wise government.”  140
The effect: “In a word, it is the best and most natural arrangement that the wisest should govern the 
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many, when it is assured that they will govern for its profit, and not for their own.”  However it is 141
important that the aristocracy does not the choosing of  its members, because if  it would its members 
would want to secure their dominance and develop a hereditary aristocracy. Thus the choosing must 
stay with the sovereign that is the choice must lie with the citizen.  
Rousseau preferred aristocracy because it does not create a conflict between the particular will 
and the general will. Further, employing the method of  elections brings talents to light. Lot wouldn’t 
create a conflict between the general will and the particular will in a democracy, but it wouldn’t bring 
talents to light as efficiently as elections. However, elections are the wrong method for a democracy 
because it would mean the sovereign decided both the method of  appointing officials (elections) and the 
officials. Where the later action depends on the former action, corruption of  who would be eligible for 
office, Rousseau thinks, would be likely. We thus conclude that the problem of  sortition is that it doesn’t 
discriminate for talents. And the problem of  democracy that it is incompatible with the method of  
elections.  
What is interesting is that both Montesquieu and Rousseau saw the obvious defect of  sortition 
that strikes us today, which is its indifference towards talent. Manin suggests that, despite this, “...both 
writers perceived that lot had also other properties or merits that at least made it an alternative worthy 
of  serious consideration, and perhaps justified that one should seek to remedy the obvious defect with 
other institutions.”  This is interesting because Montesquieu and Rousseau seem to be the last writers 142
of  the republican tradition that give lot any significant consideration.  
Within decades the idea of  lot disappeared, even though at the time lot was considered very 
much part of  the republican tradition.  Although we can only hypothesize what happened, it is clear 143
that in the American and French constitutions lot does not gain significant discussion among the 
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respective founders. As Manin writes:  
It is certainly not surprising that the founders of  representative government did not 
consider selecting rulers endowed with full freedom of  action by drawing of  lots from 
among the entire population. What is surprising is that the use of  lot, even in 
combination with other institutions, did not receive any serious hearing at all.  144
The lack of  a consideration of  sortition occurred despite there being historical examples in its favor. For 
instance, the basic defect of  lot could be addressed by allocating only certain offices to the general 
population and reserving others (like finance and military offices) for the established elite. This obvious 
remedy however did not keep lot from fading into obscurity.  
Most writers of  the republican tradition that have considered lot, even if  only peripherally in 
their writings, considered it’s main aspect - that it does not distinguish - also as the reason for which it is 
inapplicable. The argument we find in Gueniffey and Schmitt is that lot would only be applicable if  
every citizen was the same, so that subsequently choosing some of  them at random simply wouldn’t 
resemble a choice. ’  This limited consideration falls short of  all the other properties lot has, as 145 146
pointed out in chapter one. Furthermore, this limited consideration seems to show a shift in thinking 
about political representation that focuses increasingly on the qualities of  the representatives and 
decreasingly on the qualities of  the citizens. As Aristotle and Montesquieu have thought about how to 
create a virtuous body politic - by developing positive notions in teaching the citizens - Rousseau 
already focuses on the negative contract, between represented and representative. He emphasized the 
need of  separating sovereignty from government through the procedure of  elections, so that elections 
endow the latter with the general will of  the former. The citizen then not only shifts from being the 
subject of  education to being the object of  liberty, but also from being considered as a qualitative agent, 
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to not bearing any quality, but the ability to consent to government.   147
This principle of  consent carried through the Putney debates in Cromwell’s England and 
formed the basis of  authority in the legalist writers like Rousseau, Hobbes and Lock.  A century later 148
we find this principle in the opening lines of  the American Declaration of  Independence:  
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of  Happiness. - That to secure these rights, Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of  the governed.  149
Manin also notes that in August 1789 Thouret published a draft that said that “…all citizens have the 
right to concur, individuality or through their representative, in the formation of  the laws, and to submit 
only to those to which they have freely consented.”   150
	 The connection between consent and government is explicitly stated by John Lock’s Second 
Treatise on Government, when he writes that “…men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal, and 
independent, no one may be taken from this Estate and subjected to the Political Power of  another but 
by his own consent.” Three pages later he continues, “And thus that, which actually constitutes any Political 
Society, is nothing but the consent of  any number of  Freeman capable of  a majority to unite and 
incorporate themselves into such a Society. And this is that and that only which did, or could give 
beginning to any lawful Government in the World.”  Any dissent to the principle of  consent is not possible, 151
as any breach of  the law established by the general will would be seen as a breach against society.  152
With consent becoming the main focus of  political legitimacy, the citizen can only reiterate either his 
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consent, or change the general will. These are the two powers he is endowed with. To reiterate consent 
is not a choice; and to change the general will is unfeasible for the individual.  
As Manin notes, under this principle of  consent elections are the logical choice of  choosing 
representatives because choice actively conveys the consent of  being governed.  Sortition cannot be 153
perceived as an expression of  consent through choice.  The democratic character of  sortition 154
therefore could not find continuation in government based on consent.  
The ability to consent to government also went hand in hand with the notion of  private 
property. As Rousseau noted, only those qualities of  life that are affected by the social contract are 
subject to the general will, all other qualities remain untouched and have to remain untouched; they are 
freely at the discretion of  the individual. Basing government on the consent of  the voter in turn meant 
leaving a certain area of  life— private property — at the discretion of  the voter. The idea of  privacy 
and consent appears to be mutually dependent. 
As suggested above one can only hypothesize when and how the principle of  consent was linked 
to elections, much in the same way as it has been hypothesized that sortition derived from the General 
Assembly. It seems that consent in this context relates to authority, thereby consent becomes the 
indicator of  legitimacy of  this authority. This legalist approach had a legalists base, which in the context 
of  the development of  the modern state, i.e. the French and the US constitutions, was the claim for 
equality under the law. The need to extend equality under law to all citizens went hand in hand with 
the need to manufacture consent for implementing this equality. 
Max Weber writes about how equality finds its rational administration in bureaucracy.  Weber 155
writes that:  
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….bureaucracy inevitably accompanies modern mass democracy, in contrast to the 
democratic self-government of  small homogenous units. This results from its 
characteristic principle: the abstract regularity of  the exercise of  authority, which is a 
result of  the demand for ‘equality before the law in the personal and functional sense - 
hence, of  the horror of  ‘privilege,’ and the principled rejections of  doing business ‘from 
case to case.’  156
The fear of  not being treated equal causes government to administer this equality. The increase in the 
size of  states that hold equality as a principle of  legitimacy of  government necessitates the abstraction 
of  equality in the form of  law. This abstract equality, as opposed to the kind of  equality administered 
on a case to case basis by collegial bodies, causes the need for bureaucratic administration. 
As any form of  power also this bureaucratic administration has its performative agents that 
administer the equality of  society.  However, given the abstract quality of  these laws, the bureaucracy 157
is in need of  an elite.  This elite has to be skilled in juristic administration. To make society equal, 158
government needs someone to achieve equality. But this person or group will no longer be equal to 
society, because society endows them with the power to make everyone equal. 
The disparity between those that administer the law and those that experience the 
administration thereof, is a disparity of  power, and as Weber further explains, in a rational society 
quickly also a disparity of  class. “The growing complexity of  administrative tasks and the sheer 
expansion of  their scope increasingly results in the technical superiority of  those who have had training 
and experience, and will thus inevitably favor the continuity of  at lest some of  the functionaries.”  159
The persons administrating the law will on account of  their rational skills make a distinctive class of  
educated individuals, not only because of  special talents or luck but most of  all leisure. When Aristotle 
talks about the necessity of  providing enough income to create a leisured class of  citizens that can spend 
their time administering the laws of  the state, he hints at a universal principle of  necessity. In a modern 
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society this principle is still valid and is reified by those that have the means, both in terms of  leisure 
and wealth, to gain an adequate education to fulfill administrative tasks.  160
In terms of  the question of  sortition or election, it is clear that the persons administering the law 
are usually not chosen by the population and therefore only peripherally important for the sake of  this 
paper. They are not politicians per se, but rather public servants. However, their existence as a 
homogenized rational body demands also for elected or chosen representatives of  the people to act in a 
rational and somewhat homogenized way.  The elite, that is thus created by bureaucracy causes 161
representative government to respond in two ways. The first, it needs to be rational itself, so that the 
representatives are able enough to respond to the rational action of  bureaucracy. Therefore the 
bureaucratic elite is schooled in effectively administrating social action. Weber writes that beside private 
enterprise, the bureaucratic apparatus is the most rational administrator of  social action. Political 
interests thus have to find an equally rational form of  representation so as to match the effectiveness of  
bureaucracy.  This means that representatives have to be able individuals, that are part of  a rational 162
body with a political interests, that is a party.  
The second necessary implication is that representative government is in need of  the consent of  
the ‘masses’ to continue and amend this bureaucracy.  Generally speaking, any administration of  163
domination needs justification.  Justification in the political context is legitimacy.  There are different 164 165
forms of  legitimacy for different authorities. The administrators, as well as the lawmakers, need to be 
made legitimate. The administration of  equality needs to constantly manufacture consent to their role 
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of  doing so. The lawmakers need to consent to amend this administration. According to Weber, the law 
legitimizes itself  through rational authority. Those that administer equality therefore also are legitimate 
qua their rational necessity.  The lawmakers, however, legitimize themselves through charismatic 166
authority, qua being elected.   167
Unfortunately, Weber does not specifically relate why elections are the only applicable method to 
legitimize charismatic authority. But the reasons can be derived from the structure such representation 
takes. According to Weber there are two forms of  representation at work in modern democracies; 
instructed and free representation. The representative is free in the sense that he is free to vote on any 
issue however he sees fit. But, since he wants to be elected and reelected, and since he, for that purpose 
campaigns on certain interests, the representative is also to some extend instructed on representing both 
his promises he made to his voter base.  Arguably in modern politics both of  these forms of  168
representation are at work. However, Weber sees free representation as the primary characteristic of  the 
appointment of  representatives in parliament. As he writes:  
Free representation in this sense is not uncommonly an unavoidable consequence of  
the incompleteness or absence of  instructions, but in other cases it is the deliberate 
object of  choice. In so far as this is true, the representative, by virtue of  his election, 
exercises authority over the electors and is not merely their agent. The most prominent 
example of  this type is modern parliamentary representation. It shares with legal 
authority the general tendency to impersonality, the obligation to conform to abstract 
norms, politic or ethical. This feature is most pronounced in the case of  the 
parliaments, the representative bodies of  the modern political organizations. Their 
function is not understandable apart from the voluntaristic intervention of  the parties. 
It is the parties which present candidates and programs to the politically passive 
citizens. They also, by the process of  compromise and balloting within parliament, 
create the norms which govern the administrative process.  169
Interestingly Weber links free representation immediately to the creation of  parties, that present to the 
“passive citizen” their form of  government. The need for parties derives to some extend out of  the 
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character of  free representation in the context of  bureaucracy.  Therefore the power between those 170
voting and those voted for is likely to be inverted by the creation of  a party program. 
Parties, however, are necessary for candidates to rationally and effectively campaign. Candidates 
campaign to gain a mandate depend on the support structure of  a party both to extend their campaign 
program, run a campaign, and finical support. Likewise does the party depend on its candidates in 
order to receive incumbency, which it will then use to fill government with its own members.  171
Therefore, the legitimacy of  free representation also immediately implies the creation of  parties.  
Sortition would be a way of  mandating free representation. Since sortition does not rely on a 
campaign, the representative would be completely free in his votes. But since sortition does not rely on a 
campaign, it also does not rely on the rational structure of  a party. However, since the rationality of  
social action, is necessary in the modern bureaucratic state, so is the campaign, so is the party and so 
are elections. Therefore it is the rationality of  bureaucracy that makes sortition inapt.  
To sum up so far: The legal approach to equality results in two major implications for the 
political playing field: in terms of  equality, the equalization of  every citizen creates necessarily a rational 
bureaucracy. In terms of  representation, potential candidates need to form parties in order to be 
powerful enough and coordinated enough to both manage large scale campaigns and lobbies and 
effectively oppose the rational action of  bureaucracy. The need for parties implies a third and a forth 
aspect of  modern democracies. The third, even though this is an aspect Weber not explicitly argues but 
rather seems to take for granted, is the use of  elections. Weber writes, that with the development of  
bureaucracy, collegiality became in need on a single decision maker, e.g. a prime minister, or a 
president, that is generally, in need of  hierarchy. This hierarchy was needed as much within a body of  
representatives as between the general population and the representative himself.   172
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However, in order to legitimize this hierarchy, representatives had to create an incentive for the 
general population to accept this hierarchy. The incentive was the representation of  political interests, 
as Weber writes. “Where voting takes a course in accord with legitimate expectation they are legal 
parties. The existence of  legal parties, because of  the fact that their basis is fundamentally one of  
voluntary adherence, always means that the business of  politics is the pursuit of  interests.”  Were the 173
candidate not campaigning on some form of  political interest he would have no reason to receive any 
votes. This means in turn that necessarily all majority elected free representatives are elected on the 
basis of  political interests. Therefore, modern representative governments tend to focus almost 
exclusively on the politics of  interests. ’   174 175
The legal approach to equality necessitates bureaucracy. But it also necessitates the politics of  
interests. It is intuitive that political interests and equality are prone to collide. The interests of  some are 
not the interests of  all, and interests do not necessarily have to focus on making oneself  more equal. 
Nevertheless, as Weber shows, both the administration of  equality and political interests are mutually 
dependent in the modern representative democracy. ’   176 177
This contradiction and likewise mutual dependency of  bureaucratic equality and political 
interests poses a challenge to those designing a constitution. In the operation of  a government they will 
want to account for both, equality and the political interest, or in other words equality and personal 
freedom of  ambition.  However the creation of  political interests will in the long run only give a 178
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 To repeat once more: In light of bureaucracy all other forms have to be equally rational in order to achieve any social 176
change. This need for rationality implies both the creation of political parties and the necessity for a hierarchy between voter 
and representative, but also between representatives and parties. This hierarchy necessitates a focus on political interests in 
order to reach legitimacy. It is therefore the legal approach to equality that creates a focus on political interests. It is intuitive 
that equality and political interests will often collide 
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political position to those with interests, which in the extreme then only necessitates political freedom - 
that is action - for those interests.  Having the whole polity be run by political interests my turn all 179
attention away from equality or freedom, because whatever is not presented as a political interest does 
not become a political issue.   180
Robert J. Pranger and Hannah Arendt writes on this dilemma in the context of  the US-
Constitution. They both identify the preponderance of  political interests on the federal level as a 
corruption of  that overarching government today.  Rather, in the design of  the founding fathers, 181
political interests, or in their language “factions,” were supposed to remain largely on the local - or state 
level. The necessary relation between politics of  interests and elections however, caused these interests 
to creep into almost all branches of  the federal government.  
According to Pranger the design of  the Federal Government was precisely to check on political 
interests.  Political interests would result locally and the Federal Government was supposed to check 182
these interests. Thereby the federal government embodied both the support of  local interests and the 
check on local interests. However, today, the locality of  interests has corrupted the Federal 
Government.  183
According to Pranger the founders understood that private ambitions and the public good 
would collide in the long run.  They also understood that doing away with private ambitions would 184
stall the whole endeavor of  a free republic. Therefore the union had to accommodate for both, private 
ambitions and the check thereof, and it did so by separating local or state politics from national politics. 
 Of course there are other freedoms, like the freedom to speech or the freedom to deviate, but as long as these freedoms 179
are not related to any actual activity, they remain mere ideas. 
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As Pranger writes: “national power would diffuse ambition, mitigate despotism, lend itself  to 
cosmopolitan toleration and considerations of  public good, whereas local power would bring into sharp 
focus narrow interest, factious ambition and power politics.” (Pranger, 97) On a state level private 
ambitions, or, in the language of  this paper, politics of  interests, would be found. On a federal level 
these ambitions should be checked in respect to the development of  the public good.  
Pranger identifies two liberties that would embody this antagonism. The liberty of  preemption 
and the liberty to deviate. As he writes:  
In a way, this would be anarchy secured against its own excesses, a safe liberty, a form of  
political economy somewhat like laissez-faire. Instead of  defining the nation, it was believed 
that the nation would define itself  spatially and temporally as it explored the full potentials of  
its main purpose. The “fullness” of  liberty would be twofold, the liberty to preempt others or to 
compete with others, and the liberty to deviate through the practices of  toleration for others. 
For preemptive liberty, there were two virtues, the one emphasizing self-interested competition 
or ambition, the other encouraging assertive creativity. In the case of  the liberty to deviate, the 
main virtue was diversity or toleration.  185
On the one hand, the liberty to preempt is the freedom to personal ambition and creativity. It 
allowed for the realization of  the individuals ambitions, that would, in a political sense, become the 
politics of  interests. The liberty to deviate is the liberty to be of  a different opinion, a liberty that the 
federal government would have to cherish in a culture of  tolerance. These two liberties also informed 
two ways of  politics. The liberty of  preemption was interest based, therefore election based, and 
therefore created politics of  competition. The liberty to deviate, deliberative, or forum based, therefore 
not competitive but rather amicable and in search of  harmony. In the Federal Government interests 
were supposed to be represented in the House of  Representatives through elections. And tolerance 
through appointment of  collegial bodies, that is the Senate, the Presidency and the Courts. The Federal 
Government therefore was designed to account for both liberties.  
The character of  the politics of  tolerance can be best understood by looking first at the 
 Ibid., 113.185
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character of  the politics of  interests. The politics of  interests are always dependent on getting 
something or demanding something.  They always include power-play. Resulting from the freedom to 186
be ambitious and creative for the advancement of  one’s personal interests, let that be economical or 
social, the interest is soon made aggregate by the system of  elections. Only aggregate interests find 
majority positions.  Therefore in a political context, this interest will soon be competitive and 187
assertive.  
At the basis of  both self-interested competition and assertive creativity lies the goal to master 
another persons will.  This power-play in the context of  elections and parties created the same party 188
structures that Weber speaks of. As Pranger writes:  
“The difficulty was that “the people” could be embodied at the national level, in the 
politics of  competition, only in majority and minority coalition parties which, in effect, 
emphasized the preemptive claims of  their members in public policy. Not only did 
fragmentation of  national government result, but to manage these complicated demands 
organizational hierarchy was perfected at the national level.”  189
The problem was that the people could make themselves heard only via the method of  elections 
which in turn demanded majority interests and excessive power play, as has been suggested in the 
introduction to this paper. But power play in the federal government is dangerous precisely because 
“When organized power comes to dominate the national center, the idea of  the nation being the 
broadest forum for its citizenry is replaced by a believe that what organization cannot handle is not a 
national issue at all. Opens and breath are superseded by excessive strict and narrowness.”  Once the 190
whole government is orientated towards interest politics, not other politics can be imagined. Instead the 
whole polity adapts to the culture of  interest politics.  
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This culture of  interest politics is not only indicative of  the competition between different 
representatives, but also of  the relationship between voter and politician. As Pranger writes: “Those 
that are prominent are those doing the speaking, not those listening. And the so-called listeners or 
“audience” appreciate the fact: they turn on their television sets to appreciate or deprecate the speaker, 
not to hear him. He, or she, in turn, desires their appreciation of  deprecation (votes will do or positive 
gestures to the pollster).”  The politics of  condemnation also extend to the space between the citizens, 191
when politics, that are administered like war zones, clearly identify the enemy in the deviating voices. 
“There is an increasing tendency to pigeon-hole groups of  persons who need drastic action taken 
against them, virtual enemies of  the public good who turn out to be, on closer inspection, hated 
enemies of  newer coalitions of  minorities.”  Therefore the speech involved in the politics of  interests 192
stands opposite to any speech exemplifying toleration.  
The speech involved in interest politics is usually addressed to large audiences, there is no dialog 
and usually the conclusion of  the speech is somewhat predictable by the membership of  the speaker.  193
The “audience” listening, only collects cue’s for membership and affiliation, rarely however will be 
presented with a paradox contradicting expected political vocation. “Such listening is barely conscious 
in a great many instances, but rather filed through a gauntlet laid down by numerous personal and 
group variables that automatically filter out dissonant messages.”  It therefore is usually of  little 194
importance what the person speaking actually says, the focus rather lies on who is speaking.  
The distinction between those that act, the politicians, and those that watch, the potential voter, 
develops therefore a mere necessity of  administration to the inherent semiotics of  politics. The voter 
becomes merely the viewer to the game, hoping to “win,” ready to cry out in anguish and despair at 
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any foul by the opponent, and happy to ignore the own teams foul play. The rhetoric of, but also against 
and around, Donald Trump takes this game to a unprecedented speed, and interest politics to their 
rational end.  The viewer remains entirely at the passive, “civic participation will always appear as 195
subject to the speech and symbols developed by leaders, activists and influentials.”  No wonder, that 196
the contemporary citizen feels disenchanted from democratic politics.  
Opposite to the power driven interest politics the founding fathers had envisioned the public 
good of  tolerance. This good, - tolerance, or national unity - is hard to imagine from a contemporary 
perspective, so much have the national services been domesticated. By domestication they have 
“(cleared) the way for private interest’s access to every nook and cranny of  the national center, in the 
process blurring the concept of  a focus for national unity to national interests.”  The ability to create a 197
culture of  tolerance became forgotten. 
But the federalists envisioned the Union to build community. They left it open what this 
community would be like, leaving it to the people to create this culture. But they envisioned the “full” 
liberty.  
Characteristic of  the liberty of  tolerance is the political process of  speaking and listening. This 
form of  speech stands in direct opposition to the semiotics of  interests politics. The liberty of  toleration 
has to be imagined in a realm of  politics that is more than the simple search or the acquisition of  
power. “What needs to follow is a rethinking of  political space in such a way that political listening is 
also broadened from only vertical orientation toward what is said in the spaces of  power, to orientation 
toward horizontal interaction with one’s fellow citizens as well.”  Toleration is not assertive or in 198
search of  power, but rather amicable; the idea of  listing to others, that express their views in a manner 
 it is not the point of this paper to reflect on current political issues, but I cannot help myself form saying that 195
Trump seems to be the rational telos of power politics, fueled by the system of elections. 
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that is free from power-play. The political space where such “listening” takes place Pranger calls a 
“forum.”  Instead of  assertive persuasion, the speaker explains. Instead of  pigeon-holing, the 199
audience listens. Instead of  hierarchy, the forum is collegial. There is no need for the great expedience 
of  efficiency but rather there is need for thoroughness in speaking and listening. The speaker is held to 
rely, to the best of  their ability, their political experience. And the audience is held to listen so as to the 
best of  their ability understand this unique experience.   200
Instead of  an homogenized narrative of  political identity, that is as much need as it is part of  the 
elective power politics, the forum would hear personal statements from diverse viewpoints,. Hearing 
diverse viewpoints creates a space, in which citizen’s experience what it means to life with someone one 
disagrees with. Plurality of  personal expression is the political good here that turns into public good by 
being heard and understood. The public good of  hearing and understanding diverse viewpoints is 
tolerance.  201
Two characteristics of  this forum stand out in comparison to interest based politics. One is the 
speech involved. Rather than being based on persuasion and competition, this speech would be based 
on diversity and amicability. The second characteristic in a public context would be the distance 
between those that are acting and those that are not. If  the people would find themselves too far at a 
distant to those speaking, they could not identify with the personal views given. The distinction inherent 
through the psychological implications of  elections would somehow have to be overcome in order to 
make the diversity of  personal political testimonies count.  
Sortition could meet both of  these criteria. In terms of  the implications of  speech sortition 
could create a forum of  peers with personal and unique political viewpoints. Whether sortition can 
create tolerance through will be discussed in chapter four. In terms of  the psychological distance 
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sortition would not uphold the principle of  distinction inherent in elections. Sortition therefore would 
overcome the psychological distance between citizen and representative. In order to understand how 
sortition overcomes this distinction, it is important to look at how elections create this distinction. In this 
context it is worthwhile to look at what the founding fathers imagined representative democracy would 
imply for both the voter and the representative on the federal level.  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Chapter III 
Indicative of  the question of  who gets to participate in office in an elective system was the 
ratification debate between federalists and anti-federalists. The contestation about the effects of  the 
method of  election referred to the House of  Representatives. The constitution that found ratification 
one year later in 1789 states in Article I, Section 2: “The House of  Representatives shall be composed 
of  Members chosen every second Year by the People of  the several States, and the Electors in each 
State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of  the most numbers Branch if  the State 
Legislature.” This bigger, and lower house of  Congress was the only place in the US constitution at that 
time, which employed the method of  election between the general citizen and the government. The 
other institution we now consider working under the method of  election, namely the Presidency and 
the Senate, were originally appointed by the individual States. 	 	 T h e r e w e r e t h r e e 202
requirements to be elected Congressman. “No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have 
attained to the Age of  twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of  the United States, and who 
shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of  that State in which he shall be chosen.” (II,1) There was 
however another principle distinction the Anti-Federalist noted in the method election the way it was 
laid out in the constitution; namely the identification of  the natural aristocracy by the method of  
election. The difference between the Federalist and the Anti-federalists was that the former considered 
elections necessary and sufficient while the latter considered them necessary but as proposed by the 
constitution, as naturally biased toward the “natural aristocracy.”   203
 In case of the President in the procedure stated that “each state shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof 202
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives (…): but no Senator or 
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.” (II,1) 
We see that even though elections where used, the electors were not the general population but rather appointed officials by 
the individual State Governments. Likewise did the State Governments also appoint two Senators to the federal Congress, 
“chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years;” (I, 3). The House of Representatives was therefore the only institution 
that used the method of elections between citizen and representative.
 The idea of natural aristocracy, as has been pointed out previously, resembles Rousseau’s idea of an “elected aristocracy.” 203
The notion implied is that by virtue of elections the natural aristocracy is found “naturally.”
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	 The debate did not evolve around the need for elections (also if  this point was made rhetorically 
by both sides) but rather about the character of  the persons elected.  The anti-fed stressed the 204
importance of  a “like image” of  the representatives to the represented, whereas the federalists rather 
insisted on the fact that the representatives shall be the most virtuous and talented.  As Brutus 205
wrote:  206
…the very term representative, implies, that the person or body chosen for this 
purpose, should resemble those who appoint them - a representation of  the people 
of  America, if  it be a true one, must be like the people… They are the sign - the 
people are the thing signified… It must then have been intended that those who are 
placed instead of  the people, should possess their sentiments and feelings, and be 
governed by their interests, or in other words, should bear the strongest 
resemblance of  those in whose room they are substituted. It is obvious that for an 
Assembly to be true likeness of  the people of  any country, they must be 
considerably numerous.  207
Melancton Smith reiterates this idea in his speech at the New York ratification convention: “The idea 
that naturally suggests itself  to our minds, when we speak of  representatives, is it that they resemble 
those they represent; they should be a true picture of  the people: posses the knowledge of  their 
circumstances and their wants; sympathize in all their distresses, and be disposed to see their true 
interests.”  In both instances the demand was for a representative body of  government to resemble 208
the people; to signify the thing signified.  To be in their political properties (and by that term he 209
means all things related to the political) a mirror image to their constituency.  
 Manin, The Principles, 119.204
 As Madison wrote in Federalists 57: “The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers 205
men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society;”
 The Federalist promoting the ratification of the American Constitution in 1788 were Alexander Hamilton, James 206
Madison and John Jay. On the other side of the ratification debate where the Anti-Federalist, comprised of a number of 
authors among whom were Melancton Smith and John Dewitt. Both Parties published some letters anonymously; the 
Federalists would sign Publius whereas the Anti-Federalists would sign Brutus. In subsequent cases where authorship is 
unclear I will therefore refer to the respective pen names. 
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The idea of  a like image played an important role in the configuration of  the house as the Anti-
Federalists imagined it.  They insisted that in order to resemble adequately the people, the House of  210
Representatives would have to be more numerous than suggested. The provision in the constitution 
stating that “one representative for every thirty thousand citizens, but at least one representative per 
state”  was insufficient.  211
The Federalist retorted that a large body of  representatives would be impractical to the decision 
making process. Further Madison asserted that: “…it follows that if  the proportion of  fit characters (to 
the general population) be no less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a 
greater option, and consequently a greater probability of  a fit choice.”  Madison’s suggesting that fit 212
representation increases quantitatively (and qualitatively) but not proportionally is striking because it 
suggest that he considered representation not so much as a comprehensive or a exhaustive task, but as a 
unique task. The representative does not so much embody those represented but is rather believed to be 
equipped with the right faculties to represent well.  
The Anti-Federalist worried that if  the ratio of  representatives to represent was as small as the 
constitution suggested (and eventually ratified), the natural aristocracy of  the country would be the ones 
governing. As Melancton Smith pointed out in a speech in June, 1788:  
…I am convinced that this government is to constituted, that the representatives will 
generally be composed of  the first class of  the community, which I shall distinguish by 
the name of  natural aristocracy of  the country … I shall be asked what is meant by 
the natural aristocracy - and told that no such distinction of  classes of  men exists 
among us. It is true that it is our singular felicity that we have no legal or hereditary 
 Ibid.210
 „The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of Congress of the United States, and 211
within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives 
shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such 
enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island 
and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, 
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distinction of  this kind; but still here are real differences. Every society naturally 
divides itself  into classes. The author of  nature has bestowed on some greater 
capacities than on others - birth, education, talents and wealth create distinctions 
among men as society, men of  this class will command a superior degree of  respect - 
and if  the government is so constituted as to admit but a few to exercise the powers of  
it, it will, according to the natural course of  things, be int their hands.  213
Brutus noted:  
According to the common course of  human affairs, the natural aristocracy of  the 
country will be elected. Wealth always creates influence, and this is generally much 
increased by large family connections… It is probable hat but few of  the merchants, 
and those of  the most opulent and ambitious, will have a representation of  their body 
- few of  them are characters sufficiently conspicuous to attract the notice of  electors 
of  the state in so limited a representation.  214
The Anti-Federalists understood that “in the common course of  human affairs” the “natural 
aristocracy” of  the country would be elected. Of  course, as Melancton points out, this term does not 
refer to a hereditary aristocracy. Rather he lists: “birth, education, talents and wealth” as the signifiers 
that makes one class more aristocratic than another. Brutus reiterates this focus on class when he says, 
“…wealth always creates influence, and this is generally much increased by large family connections.” 
The Anti-Federalists feared that the people would not find adequate representation and subsequently 
find themselves disenchanted from the government. 
The consequence will be, they will have no confidence in their legislature, suspect them of  
ambitious views, be jealous of  every measure they adopt, and will not support the laws they 
pass.” If  the people do not support the laws they are governed by they will not help the 
government to execute them. Brutus illustrates further: “Hence the government will be 
nerveless and inefficient, and no way will be left to render it otherwise, but by establishing 
an armed force to execute the laws at the point of  the bayonet - - a government of  all others 
the most to be dreaded.  215
 quoted by Manin, the Principles, 113, Melancton Smith, speech of June 20, 1788, Storing, VI, 12, 16. 213
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The sensible realization that with such a ratio the voter would feel disenchanted from the 
representative, unfortunately fell through the cracks of  the debate. Rather, the disagreement continued 
about the characteristics of  this natural aristocracy. Brutus’ dreadful narrative, could not distract from 
the fact, that the Anti-Federalists did not offer a sufficient explanation of  what exactly they mend by 
natural aristocracy – in the sense of  who exactly would fall under it – and how this natural aristocracy 
would come to be elected. Certainly Brutus speaks of  the “common course of  human affairs” and 
“large family connections,” but these notions were weak and not descriptive enough to actually discredit 
the Federalist provision of  the constitution.   216
Referring to the inability of  the Anti-Federalists to clearly define the link between elections as 
proposed by the constitution and the rise of  the natural aristocracy, the Federalists rather easily 
retorted:  
Why, then, are we told so often of  an aristocracy? For my part, I hardly know the 
meaning of  this word, as it is applied… But who are the aristocracy among us? 
Where do we find men elevated to a perpetual rank above their fellow-citizens, and 
possessing powers independent of  them? The arguments of  the gentlemen (the Anti-
Federalists) only go to prove that there are men who are rich, men who are poor, some 
who are wise, and others who are not; that indeed every distinguished man is an 
aristocrat… This description, I presume to say is ridiculous. The image is a phantom. 
Does the new government render a rich more eligible than a poor one? No. It 
requires no such qualification.  217
This retort ridiculed the critique of  the Anti-Federalists by forcing their argument to show that they had 
not sufficiently identified what constituted a natural aristocrat and how electors would prefer such 
aristocracy. As Madison wrote earlier: “…Who are to be the objects of  popular choice? Every citizen 
 Further should the Anti-Federalists not be understood as insisting that everybody be represented in Congress. Rather 216
“They wished only that the main components of society be represented, with a special emphasis on the middling ranks 
(freeholders, independent artisans, and small tradesmen).” Manin, the Principles, 112.
 Hamilton, speech of June 21, 1788, in Elliot (ed.), The Debates..., Vol. II, p. 256 as quoted by Manin, the Principles, 199.217
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whose merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of  his country.”  One the one hand, 218
there was effectively no property clause in the constitution, or any other, except for concerning age 
(>25years) and state residence, that would prohibit a citizen from running for office. On the other hand 
was the openness to “every citizen whose merit may recommend him” may not have been as inclusive 
as, it could be understood. The Federalists welcomed the tendency of  the electoral process to favor 
natural aristocracy, not only on the basis of  merit, but also on the basis of  riches and property interests. 
As Hamilton said in a speech:  
Look through the rich and the poor of  the community, the learned and the ignorant. 
Where does virtue predominate? The difference indeed consists, not in the quantity, 
but kind, of  vices, which are incident to various classes; and here the advantage of  
character belongs to the wealthy. Their vices are probably more favorable to the 
prosperity of  the state than those of  the indigent, and partake less of  moral 
depravity.  219
In some sense the federalists welcomed the tendency of  the electoral process to favor the natural 
aristocracy. Among others, one reason for this preference might have been the Shays rebellion.  220
Another reason might be the obvious one stated above, that the more wealthy part of  the population 
was considered more virtuous then the general population. As Madison states: “Large districts are 
manifestly favorable to the election of  persons of  general respectability, and of  probable attachment to 
the rights of  property, over competitors depending on the personal solicitations practicable on the 
contracted theatre.”  Due to the size of  the country the foundational project was to encompass, 221
Madison thought it more likely that people of  a general respectability would be chosen. A larger voting 
district made it more difficult to buy voters with favors or false promises – if  that is the meaning of  the 
 Alexander Hamilton et al., The Federalist Papers (New York: Signet Classic, 2014), 57.218
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 “(…) which broke out in Massachusetts in 1786, … It contributed to the animus against “democracy” that was expressed 220
in Philadelphia. The small farmers of the western part of the state had revolted against the policy favorable to the seabord 
mercantile interests pursued by the legislature in Boston.” Manin, the Prinicples, 122, Footnote 72.
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‘personal solicitation’ on the ‘contracted theater’ – and so was favorable to candidates with the proper 
and true attachment to property rights.   222
As Manin put it, both the federalists and anti-federalists recognized the tendency of  the electoral 
system to favor “natural aristocracy.”  As said before, it was unclear to some extent who would belong 223
to this aristocracy, and especially how it would be discerned. Whether it was talent, merit or wealth, 
essentially natural aristocracy meant a certain level of  superiority, which was valued even by the anti-
federalists. It was understood that in the “common course of  human affairs” the difference between 
representatives and represented would be upheld precisely by those voting, being naturally inclined to 
choose the most favorable representative.  
This “natural tendency” differs from any legal prerequisite for representatives. Property 
qualifications were part of  the debate. However, (here again) it was the size of  the country and the 
difference in property by region that caused the debate on a requirement to stall. According to Manin 
the absence of  a property clause created an elective system that in most cases would favor the natural 
aristocracy, which, however, in few cases could cause voters to vote for a representative from among 
themselves.  The absence of  a legal requirement like the property clause furthermore didn’t create an 224
incentive for the voting classes to persuade the governing classes to get rid of  their legal advantage and 
thus avoided conflict.  In this sense the elective system, drawing on “natural aristocracy” informed by 225
the size of  the land, embodied a certain flexibility that made it possible, if  unlikely, for the people to 
choose from amongst themselves a representative. The federalist and anti-federalists quite correctly 
designed and named the elective system as an aristocratic institution, not exclusively but 
overwhelmingly. An elective system that erred on the side of  aristocracy and thus on the side of  
 This remains only true if private interests remain private, that is, remain outside of majority driven politcy.222
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distinction among the population.  
In the same way that the Anti-Federalists couldn’t clearly define how exactly the natural 
aristocracy was going to gradually take over government, the Federalists could not quite discern how 
they would guarantee their obvious preference of  a propertied class in government. To that extend it 
was their mutual intuition on the effects of  elections that caused the former to worry and the later to 
hope.  
But was unfortunately missed during this debate was the question of  agency. When Hamilton 
wrote: “But who are the aristocracy among us? Where do we find men elevated to a perpetual rank 
above their fellow-citizens, and possessing powers independent of  them?,” it is not the aristocrats that 
are to be found but the men that had political agency at the time. Namely Hamilton and all those 
involved in the debate. Hannah Arendt will speak to this fact when she identifies the founding moment - 
the moment of  giving oneself  a government - as the greatest moment of  political freedom to act.  She 226
laments subsequently that the design of  the constitution did not hold any opportunity for the general 
citizen to become politically active, meaning, no requisite for including townships in some way as a 
necessary part of  government. Instead the federal government was designed as self-sufficient (checks 
and balances) and remote (Washington D.C.), making it unlikely for the general citizen to have any part 
in this government. As Arendt writes:  
…the age old distinction between ruler and ruled which the Revolution had set out to 
abolish through the establishment of  a republic has asserted itself  again; once more, the 
people are not admitted to the pubic realm, once ore business go government has become 
the privilege of  the few, who alone may ‘exercise (their) virtuous dispositions. The realist 
is that the people must either sink into ‘lethargy, the forerunner of  death to the public 
liberty’ or ‘preserve the spirit of  resistance’ to whatever government they have elected, 
since the only power they remain is ‘the reserve power of  revolution’.  227
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Arendt's words precisely characterize the current state of  politics. Transferring the freedom to act by 
the method of  elections, the people are left with no agency themselves and therefore will either feel 
fatigue or resistance toward their government. That modern means of  communication are able to 
animate the masses behind certain political interests, does not change the fact, that the “excercise (of) 
their virtuous dispositions,” only the few in power are able to try, for modern forms of  animation rarely 
come about in virtuous dispositions.  
The necessary distinction between voter and representative Manin tries to identify more clearly 
in the chapter of  his book titled: the aristocratic character of  election: a pure theory. He frames his question in 
the following way:  
…We shall ask here whether there are certain elements intrinsic to the elective method 
with inegalitarian implications and leading to the elected being in some way superior 
to the electors. This way of  framing the question is in line with the tradition of  
political philosophy. Aristotle, Montesquieu, and Rousseau all stated that elections 
were intrinsically aristocratic.  228
This inquiry is purely theoretical. It is the attempt to rationally locate the principle of  distinction in the 
elective process. Were this principle not prevalent, than all citizens, beside being equal in their ability to 
cast a vote for a representative, would also be equal in their ability to being chosen as a representative. 
Despite Manin’s justification from above, one might object that choice will naturally always 
discriminate, that there is not need to go into a purely theoretical analyses to prove the obvious. But this 
misses the question, again, how exactly such choice is informed.  
In order to see whether there are any intrinsic elements with inegalitarian implications in the 
elective system, one has to first imagine a heuristic image of  the same.  This image displays a system in 229
which every individual can vote and can be voted for. There are, however, only a limited number of  
representative positions available. Therefore, only a limited number of  people can actually attain office.  
 Manin, the Principles, 134.228
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The voters have to make a choice between those they vote for and those they don’t. From the 
perspective of  the voter they have to discriminate after some principle of  personal preference.  The 230
preference is personal because there are no official or abstract criteria that determine choice in an 
election.  Different from a competitive examination (in maybe math or sports), the result in the 231
elective method depends solely on the choice of  individuals, after the old absolutist motto: “Sic volo, sic 
jubeo, stat pro ratione voluntas” (“Thus I wish, thus I ordain, my will takes the place of  reason”).   232
Likewise form the perspective of  the candidate, there are no official criteria - abstractly and 
announced in advance - that he may base his campaign on. Manin notes that “…candidates may try to 
guess what the voters will require. But even supposing that it were possible to constitute, on the basis of  
the votes, a general and abstract definition of  the desired qualities, this is something that can only be 
known ex post facto.”  These considerations express the inegalitarian character of  the method of  233
elections that is likewise its freedom. They, however, do not show how the elective process chooses 
candidates that are considered superior to the one’s choosing.  
Superiority comes about in the moment of  choice, as Manin points out: “If  candidates are 
indistinguishable, voters will be indifferent, and thus unable to choose in the sense of  preferring one to 
another. To be chosen, therefore, a candidate must display at least one characteristic that is positively 
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valued by his fellow-citizens and that the other candidates do not possess, or not to the same extent.”  234
In order to be distinguishable the candidate needs to have at least one quality the other candidates do 
not have. This one quality should be both positively valued and rare in the society, so that the candidate 
is both positively seen and unrivaled in respect to this quality. What is rare and also positively valued in 
terms of  quality constitutes superiority: “…those who possess it are different and superior from those 
who do not.”  This means as Manin asserts, that “...the distinction requirement inherent in a elective 235
system is entirely structural.”  The distinction, whatever it is based on, derives entirely from the 236
elective moment. Superiority derives thus from the structure of  the method of  election.  
To explain this phenomenon of  superiority closer Manin draws on “advantages conferred by 
salience in attracting attention.”  This term “salience” derives form cognitive psychology as describing 237
a quality of  particularity. It has been shown, as Manin writes, that “salient stimuli elicit strong 
evaluative judgments.”  It is in line with psychological research that those candidates, who exhibit a 238
particular and positively valued characteristic, will be accepted by the voter, that candidates with a no 
particular characteristic, will be ignored, and that candidates with a particular characteristic that is 
negatively valued, will be rejected.  Thus also on a cognitive level, elections imply superiority, if  only 239
in as much as that superiority is constituted by saliency.   240
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That this distinctive principle informs political interests seems unlikely. Likewise, however, it also 
unlikely that representatives are chosen merely for their talents or aptitude in representing certain 
political interests. Rather, what is happening in the elective moment, is something like the creation of  
hierarchy that finds psychological justification in saliency, not in adequate representation. Even if  this 
saliency does not create a distinct class of  human beings that forever will be likely to govern, it does 
create psychological membership to those that do not govern.  
The psychological distance between those governing and those not governing therefore seems to 
be informed solely on the moment of  choice. Since this choice is not informed by political interests 
necessarily, the legitimacy between representative and voter, is not either. Therefore consent is not given 
to representation of  interests, but rather to the moment of  choice. Therefore the choice in elections, 
holds no other political agency, then subjugation. The distance between voter and politician therefore is 
also informed on a psychological level.  
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Chapter IV 
The distinction between those governing and those not governing is not merely a distinction 
based on necessity, but also a distinction based on psychology. The distinction is informed by having the 
opportunity to govern, and thus seeing oneself  as a public political being, and not having any such 
opportunity, and thereby see oneself  merely as a private individual. Hand in hand with the distinction 
between those that govern and those that do not, goes the disappointment or fatigue of  the later in the 
former. Obviously, the only remedy to this distinction is giving all people the opportunity to govern.  
The revolution meant to spread the possibility of  having a share in government, or of  imagining 
oneself  governing, to all. But immediately after the creation of  the constitution, “…the age old 
distinction between ruler and ruled which the Revolution had set out to abolish through the 
establishment of  a republic (had) asserted itself  again,”  The reason for the reestablishment of  the 241
distinction between representative and citizen was the failure of  establishing a political body that would 
give the opportunity to participate in government to all citizens. Instead, today, the constitution only 
accounts for the representation of  the interests and therefore only for political participation of  few.  
The reason not to include all may have resulted out of  the wish to create a constitution that 
would be last. To create a constitution that would last resulted out of  the fear that continuing the 
revolutionary spirit would necessarily overturn the constitution. But it was not necessarily the 
revolutionary spirit — in the sense of  creating a new government — that needed to continue, but 
simply the opportunity of  involving everyone in government. In that sense the opportunity of  giving 
oneself  a government becomes the opportunity of  acting in government.  242
What made the constitutional moment exhilarating was the experience of  having a share in a 
beginning. This beginning was the of  giving oneself  government. The beautiful experience of  the 
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freedom of  creating something good for all and that for eternity. Or in John Adams words: “to establish 
a government … more agreeable to dignity of  human nature, … and to transmit such government 
down to their posterity with the means of  securing and preserving it forever.”  To found for all 243
therefore was a feeling of  purpose for all. A feeling rooted in the community and for the community.  244
This purpose wanted to transpire community into the future.  
Because they wanted their constitution to last, the founders of  had a similar image of  man as 
the Ancient Greeks. An image of  man as fallibly that needed to be corrected. 
Politically, the outstanding characteristic of  the Christian era had been that this ancient 
view of  world and man – of  mortal men moving in an everlasting or potentially 
everlasting world – was reversed: men in possession of  an everlasting life moved in an 
ever-changing world whose ultimate fate was death; and the outstanding characteristic of  
the modern age was that it turned once more to antiquity to find a precedent for its own 
new preoccupation with the future of  the man-made world on earth.  245
Like Aristotle the founders attempted to create a government that would make people good by 
transpiring the exhilarating feeling of  creating a community through the Union into the future. This 
community would be ‘more agreeable to dignity of  human nature’ and therefore would correct man to 
live in an everlasting Union.  
When the ancient Athenians had ‘no doubt what (they) meant by democracy’, as Headlam 
relates, he speaks, in the widest sense, about community. The Athenians had a clear idea of  what the 
demos was doing in the ekklesia because they were part of  it. Through sortition they had found a way to 
transpire the freedom and equality associated with being part of  this community also into 
administrative positions of  government. The citizen therefore, in Ancient Athens, found himself  also in 
administrative government always among peers. When Ober writes that “…the symbolic value of  
ordinary citizens conducting all levels of  state business must have been considerable,” he notes about 
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how “…the awe that an Athenian might feel upon confronting a magistrate (…) would now be a 
function of  the office itself, not of  the private status of  the officeholder. Awe would therefore be 
ascribed to the reflected grandeur of  the sate, which the magistrate in some sense symbolized.”  But 246
because being chosen by sortition was no different then being entrusted by the community, the awe the 
citizen must have felt for the grandeur of  the state also always was the awe the citizen felt for his 
community. The community in Ancient Athens therefore extended in all aspects of  the state and 
thereby recreated itself.  
The founding fathers had a similar, if  not extended idea for the role of  Union. The role was not 
only to allow for, but also to build community. Contrary to “…those who associate genuine community 
with physical intimacy, the American national government would be designed to play as large — or 
larger — a role in community formation as it would in building the pyramidal structured of  American 
government.”  The Union was thus not only a overarching form of  government, but also, or maybe 247
first of  all, a Union.  
This Union was supposed to be ruled by “full liberty.”  Full liberty was to be achieved by 248
allowing for both the liberty of  the individual to be ambitious and the liberty of  the individual to 
deviate. The liberty of  the individual to be ambitious was the liberty to fight for one’s private interests. 
The liberty to deviate allowed for the creation of  tolerance by hearing unique viewpoints. Together they 
would create the community build under and by the Union. 
Elections, however, only gave space to the liberty be ambitious. The liberty to deviate fell silent 
over time. Elections only gave space to aggregate views on political interests and therefore only gave 
space the liberty to be ambitious and competitive not to be tolerant. If  sortition could have given space 
to the liberty to deviate, the founding fathers had not thought of  it, or thought it inapt. 
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Sortition could, however, have created the political form for the liberty to deviate. The political 
form for the liberty to deviate is a forum. The role of  this forum would be similar to the original role of  
the Senate as a body of  appointed individuals who would debate the public good of  tolerance. Their 
individual voice could not define tolerance, but collegially they could.  
Opinions are formed and tested in a process of  exchange of  opinion against opinion, 
their differences can be mediated only by passing them through the medium of  a body 
of  men, chosen for the purpose; these men, taken by themselves, are not wise, and yet 
their common purpose is wisdom – wisdom under the conditions of  the fallibility and 
frailty of  the human mind.”   249
Sortition would have enabled ‘to pass opinions through the medium of  a body of  men’ by appointing a 
collegial body of  peers. In such a position the individual could speak and listen to diverse opinions and 
therefore attest to the public good of  tolerance. In turn, the public would witness these examples of  
listen and speaking and see or experience the liberty to deviate. As such a randomly chosen, and 
demographically representative body of  citizen’s could debate the public good from the diverse 
perspectives of  the individual and unique political experience. By adding sortition the full liberty of  the 
Union may have been preserved. 
The founding fathers had not implemented a randomly chosen body, which does not mean that 
they were unaware of  the limit the constitution would impose on the individuals ability to act politically. 
Especially Jefferson was acutely aware that limit. He understood that he was part of  a group that had 
the privilege of  thinking about the implications of  creating government, a privilege that subsequently 
could never be repeated without reforming the state.  
… the reason Jefferson, throughout his long life, was carried away by such 
impracticalities was that he knew, however dimly, that the Revolution, while it had 
given freedom to the people, had failed to price a space where this freedom could be 
exercised. Only the representatives of  the people, not the people themselves, had an 
opportunity to engage in those activities ‘expressing, discussing, and deciding’ which 
in a positive sense are the activities of  freedom.  250
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The freedom to express, discuss and especially to decide - so as to give the two previous acts any weight 
- would be attainable only to the few chosen for office. But since these offices related to the 
representation of  political interests, the opinions in these discussions would rarely relate to the plurality 
of  the political experience of  the citizen. Rather, the opinions in elected bodies would serve the 
competitive character of  interest politics. 
It is not only, and perhaps not even primarily, because of  the overwhelming power of  the 
many that the voice of  the few loses all strength and all plausibility under such 
circumstances (the elective structure of  interest politics); public opinion, by virtue if  its 
unanimity, provokes unanimous opposition and thus kills true opinions everywhere.  251
The diversity of  public opinion can not be expressed in the context of  competitive interest politics, 
because the whole structure aims at homogeneity instead of  plurality. Public opinion can only be 
expressed in a body of  peers that cherish such plurality. 
Hannah Arendt and Robert J. Prangers had a similar understanding of  the need for such a body 
of  peers. Arendt identifies that both politics of  interests and public opinion were part of  the 
constitutional design.  Arendt also writes that the federal government was supposed to balance these 252
characteristics. “The power of  government was supposed to control the passion of  social interests and 
to be controlled, in its turn, by individual reason.”  And like Pranger Arendt sees the current 253
preponderance of  politics of  interests or ambition as a corruption of  the federal government. “But in 
this republic, as it presently turned out, there was no space reserved, no room left for the exercise of  
precisely those qualities which had been instrumental in building it.”  Therefore the full liberty that 254
Pranger identifies as a combination of  the liberty of  preemption and the liberty to deviate, Arendt 
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terms the institution of  public freedom and public happiness.  The corruption of  the federal 255
government took place precisely because it endowed the citizens with the power to vote, but not with 
the power to try themselves as political beings in the sense of  ‘expressing, discussing and deciding.’  
That the corruption of  the government would derive from the people itself  was historically 
unfamiliar.  In the past the ruling class usually corrupted the privacy of  the individual. Therefore the 256
remedy was sought in the creation of  private property, as the space the government would have no 
access to. However, with the development of  an egalitarian government and the precondition of  
equality for all and the limited freedom to vote, private interests become the main threat to privacy.  257
As Arendt writes in contrast to the historical conception of  privacy. The private realm, becoming 
political through its transformation into interests, resulted in a majority driven government that was 
considered legitimate in corrupting the public realm of  tolerance. 
Like Pranger, Arendt sees the only solution against this overbearing in the public realm itself. 
She writes that “…the only remedies against the misuse of  public power by private individuals lie in 258
the public realm itself, in the light which exhibits each deed enacted within its boundaries, in the very 
visibility to which it exposes all those who enter it.”  The individual being empowered not only to vote 259
but also to ‘express, discuss and decide’ is forced to enter the public realm and thereby forced to try 
himself  or herself  as a public persona. Only through this motion can private interests be kept in check. 
The ballot box does not allow for the opportunity to try oneself  as a public persona.  Even 260
though the ballot box was not necessarily a secret institution, it was not a away of  stepping into the 
public realm. Instead voting was just an extension of  the private space. When the Ancient Greeks had 
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so much of  their administration conditioned on voting in public, giving account or being held 
accountable for one’s political actions, this had the effect forcing the individual constantly into the 
public realm. And it was in this public realm, i.e. the ekklesia, the council, the magistrates or the courts, 
that private interests were discussed. The public space therefore also always became a space in which 
private interests were made public and therefore balanced by the community. 
Jeffersons saw the fact of  giving people the right to vote, but not a space to try themselves as 
political being as the ‘mortal danger’ to the republic.  Jefferson did not suggest sortition as a way of  261
allowing for the opportunity of  being and acting as citizens, even thought again, this method seems to 
suggest itself. What Jefferson envisioned instead was a form of  involving the citizen in the political realm 
by including wards. These wards, like the townships, acted as micro republics that would create the full 
liberty of  the general republican government. Like in Athens, community was already existent in these 
townships. The advantage of  including them “…would offer a better way to collect the voice of  the 
people than the mechanics of  representative government;”  And collecting these community voices 262
would at the same time create a wider sense of  community and therefore an incentive for the public 
good.  
The wider range of  participation would increase freedom both actively and passively for all. On 
the side of  the citizen, it would allow for the opportunity “…to make everybody feel ‘that he is a 
participator in the government of  affairs, not merely at an election one day in the year, but every 
day;’.”  On the side of  the government to increase the sources of  power was to multiply power. And 263
to multiply power following Montesquieu’s insight, multiplies freedom.  264
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There are two intriguing parts phrases in Arendt’s quote that relate to both sortition and 
Jefferson’s and later Arendt’s design of  a different representative state. Namely, the difference between 
‘feeling’ that one participated in government and ‘participating in government every day’. Arendt uses 
both descriptions in the same phrase. The reason is, that in the space that related the elementary 
republics (wards & townships) to the general government, a pyramidal system would be implemented 
that allowed for both, ‘feeling that one participated’ and ‘participating.’  
In this pyramid structure each tier would collegially vote for a representative to the next higher 
tear.  The first tier was created on the ‘elementary’ level through voluntary participation. It would 265
allow all those to participate in government that felt themselves being called into public service. The 
second tier would be made up of  all those voted representative of  the first tier and so on. Elections 
decided who would advance to the next higher tier. Advancing was based on the trust of  the voters 
from the tier below. Each representative had been endowed with the trust of  his voters and therefore 
each tier made a body of  peers. Until a group on individuals would come out on top and gain access to 
the federal government and participate in government.  
Within this scheme all authority was based on trust. Arguably, authority was also limited to the 
space between two tiers. This system allowed for the participating of  all those that wanted, in terms of  
‘expressing, discussing, and deciding,’ and distributed “to every one exactly the functions (they were) 
competent to do,”  meaning the members of  each tier decided whether a candidate advanced to the 266
next nighter tier. 
In this pyramidal system community would be build on each tier. This community would first be 
build by all those volunteering. But subsequently, on the higher tiers, community would be build on the 
trust of  the voters, because each representative had been endowed with such trust. The representative 
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then again would build a body of  peers and advance another individual on the basis of  trust. All higher 
levels, therefore were build on trust, and on all levels the individual could realize itself  as political being.  
It is difficult not to agree with Arendt’s conception of  a different, more communal polity. She 
relates a design that is purely informed by the citizen’s individual calling to politics and checked only by 
trust of  his or her peers, that is the members of  the community on each respective tear. This trust 
makes it challenging for parties to corrupt elections on the basis of  some aggregate, misplaced personal 
interest. This trust also makes it difficult to corrupt the individual sense of  self  as political being, 
because this trust is reward for trustworthy political action. Each tier is a stage for the eudaimon.  267
Therefore the need for trust creates a community of  truly political citizens, or as Arendt relates the poet 
René Char saying:  
‘If  I survive, I know that I shall have to break with the aroma of  these essential years, 
silently rejected (not repress) my treasure.’ The treasure, he thought, was that he had 
‘found himself,’ that he no longer suspected himself  of  ‘insincerity,’ that he needed no 
mask and no make-believe to appear, that wherever he went he appeared as he was to 
others and to himself, that he could afford ‘to go naked’.  268
A political community thus based on the trust of  others upon one’s personal political calling 
allows for the “full liberty” of  the individual to realize itself  as political being. This is not merely truly 
political, but also truly beautiful.  
Nevertheless, it is the point of  this paper to relate sortition to the political design of  such a 
community. One apparent difference between Arendt’s design and sortition is that with the later the 
representatives would not be chosen by the trust of  their peers but by the impartial agent of  chance. 
Sortition, however would not relate on a pyramid scheme, whereas Arendt’s design arguably does. Even 
thought authority, positively in the sense of  legitimacy, is only created from one tear to another, the 
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legislative ability of  a higher tier would still be binding for all lower tiers and all those not involved in 
any tier. Likewise community is only build on each tier, not however between the highest tier and the 
general population. The voluntary aspect of  the ‘elementary’ tier is also prevalent in sortition because 
participation in the lottery is based on voluntarism. The representative would therefore likewise be 
among his or her peers.  
As has been said before sortition would offer unique and diverse testimony of  the political 
experience in the United States, which would give both a voice to those chosen, and the example of  
listening to those among the chosen who are not speaking and to the general public who is watching. 
Sortition therefore could be a way of  representing opinion, next to the method of  elections that 
represents interests. Again following Montesquieu’s insight of  the multiplication of  power, this addition 
is apt to realize the full liberty envisioned in the constitution. The community aspects of  sortition would 
be the testimonies of  those speaking and listening that would give an example with the speech of  the people 
(as opposed to legal or interest based speech) of  what it means to be a political being.  
One might oppose that sortition would still only enable few. This depends on the amount of  
political bodies created using sortition. One could imagine a similar multi-body system as Arendt 
suggests, whilst her method could be criticized for silencing again the plurality of  political experience by 
congealing through gradation.   269
One might oppose that sortition would not embody the plurality of  the political experience, but 
just the experience of  those chosen. This is true and cannot be argued with. There are, however, ways 
of  adjusting the system of  choosing toward a demographically representative simple. The number of  
voices again would depend on the number of  bodies chosen. Still only a number of  voices would be 
heard, and adjusting demographically runs into the same limits as do theories of  modern polling. 
 Since opinions need to congeal through the pyramid structure to those that are the most trustworthy, here again, the 269
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   67
One might oppose that even though a diverse body of  citizens would be chosen, those would not 
be the right citizens to create public opinion. This misunderstands the quality of  both the general will 
and the vision of  the Senate, namely that the general will is more than its parts, and namely that the 
individuals in the Senate are not wise, but rather that their common purpose is wisdom.  There is 270
ample data on the sensitivity of  the decision reached by randomly chosen political bodies.  These 271
decisions seem further not so much based on better information, but on the deliberation among 
peers.  272
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Conclusion 
In the end, two related questions remain. Can a demographically representative sample be 
satisfactory? Can we abandon trust for the sake of  abandoning a pyramid scheme of  hierarchy? 
These two questions are related because their outcome equally informs the trust of  the public in 
government, and in turn their own understanding of  what it means to be part of  this American 
community. If  demographic representation is not enough to create an identification with those speaking 
and those listening, the ability of  sortition to create a forum for the public good diminishes. On the 
other hand, if  the public does identify with the people speaking and listening and therefore start to see 
themselves, and feel, as political beings, community is created. The true abandoned for the sake of  
abandoning the pyramid scheme is found without such a scheme.  
Sortition derived from the trust the Athenians had in their community. By having the courage to 
trust each other in a system based on chance, the Athenians were able to extend the principles of  
democracy, that is freedom and equality, into the administration of  the state. This trust not only allowed 
for the the freedom of  any citizen to become a public persona but also for a constant presence of  
community. But can community in turn, derive from the method of  sortition? Or, in other words, can 
trust derive from the method of  sortition? 
We do not know.  
There is a reason why Arendt has to turn to poetry to find a description of  what a community 
based on trust feels like. We have no such community in our political world. But poetry is of  the world 
and therefore suggests that such community is possible. Poetry means ‘to do,’ therefore, all we can do in 
finding out whether such community is possible through sortition, is trying it.   273
 Poetry derives from the Greek ποιέω, which means “to make.”273
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